Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one's chances of winning?

Experimental Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 297-303

  McKinney Jr , C Nicholas ^a   Van Huyck, John B ^b  

^a RHODES COLLEGE   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Experiment; Human behavior; Nim; Perfect information

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746106505     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9129-x     Document Type: Review

References (11)

1. Aumann, R. (1996). Reply to Binmore. Games and Economic Behavior, 17(1), p. 138-146
2. Binmore, K. (1996). A note on backward induction. Games and Economic Behavior, 17(1), p. 135-137
3. Binmore, K., McCarthy, J., Ponti, G., Samuelson, L., & Shaked, A. (2002). A backward induction experiment. Journal of Economic Theory
4. Bouton, C. L. (1901-1902). Nim a game with a complete mathematical theory. The Annals of Mathematics, 3(1), 35-39
5. Ho, T.-H., Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1995). Iterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental p-beauty contests. American Economic Review, 88(4)
6. Johnson, E., Camerer, C., Sen, S., & Rymon, T. (2002). Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining experiments. Journal of Economic Theory, 104, p. 16-47
7. McKinney, C. N., Jr. & Van Huyck, J. B. Estimating bounded rationality and pricing performance uncertainty, forthcoming in The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
8. Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 85(5)
9. Selten, R. (1978). The chain store paradox. Theory and Decision,
10. reprinted in Models of Strategic Rationality (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988)
11. Stahl, D., & Wilson, P. (1995). On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1)