Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking

Public Choice

Volumn 133, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 199-229

  Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe ^a,b   Langlais, Eric ^c   Lovat, Bruno ^c   Parisi, Francesco ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITÉ LOUIS PASTEUR   (France)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Rent dissipation; Rent seeking; Tullock's paradox

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548573619     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5     Document Type: Article

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