Private information and intertemporal job assignments

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 531-548

  Prescott, Edward Simpson ^a   Townsend, Robert M ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LABOR SUPPLY;

EID: 33645677744     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00386.x     Document Type: Article

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