Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 482-500

  Snyder Jr , James M ^a   Ting, Michael M ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Elections; Interest groups; Political agency; Term limits; Vote buying

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149123794     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.009     Document Type: Article

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