Probabilistic voting and accountability in elections with uncertain policy constraints

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 41-68

  Meirowitz, Adam ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247272445     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00297.x     Document Type: Article

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