On being in a quandary: Relativism vagueness logical revisionism

Mind

Volumn 110, Issue 437, 2001, Pages 45-98

  Wright, Crispin ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61449378864     PISSN: 00264423     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/mind/110.437.45     Document Type: Article

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