On mixed inferences and pluralism about truth predicates

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 50, Issue 200, 2000, Pages 380-382

  Beall, J C ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244484004     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00194     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. P.T. Geach, 'Ascriptivism', Philosophical Review, 69 (1960), pp. 221-5,
2. 'Assertion', Philosophical Review, 74 (1965), pp. 449-65.
3. C.J.G. Wright, 'Realism, Anti-realism, Irrealism, Quasi-realism', in P. French et al. (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XII (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 25-49.
4. Truth and Objectivity (Harvard UP, 1992).
5. C. Tappolet, 'Mixed Inferences: a Problem for Pluralism about Truth Predicates', Analysis, 57 (1997), pp. 209-10.
6. N. Rescher, Many-valued Logic (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).
7. J. Beall and G. Restall, 'Logical Consequence', in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (CSLI, Stanford Univ., forthcoming).
8. I am grateful to Mark Colyvan, Bas van Fraassen, Jay Garfield and Ed Gettier, each of whom has contributed to this paper in various ways.