Escalating penalties for repeat offenders

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 170-178

  Emons, Winand ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Crime and punishment; Repeat offenders

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548030441     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.005     Document Type: Article

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