Subgame-perfect punishment for repeat offenders

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 496-502

  Emons, Winand ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242675292     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/cbh076     Document Type: Review

References (14)

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3. Burnovski, M., and Z. Safra. "Deterrence Effects of Sequential Punishment Policies: Should Repeat Offenders Be More Severely Punished?" International Review of Law and Economics, 14(3), 1994, 341-50.
4. Chu, C. Y., Cyrus, Sheng-cheng Hu, and Ting-yuan Huang. "Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely." International Review of Law and Economics, 20(3), 2000, 127-40.
5. Dittmann, I. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment if Governments Don't Maximize Welfare." Discussion Paper, Humboldt- Universität Berlin, 2001. Available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id = 274449.
6. Emons, W. "A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders." International Review of Law and Economics, 23, 2003, 253-59.
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10. Polinsky, M., and D. Rubinfeld. "A Model of Fines for Repeat Offenders." Journal of Public Economics, 46(3), 1991, 291-306.
11. Polinsky, M., and S. Shavell. "On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence." International Review of Law and Economics, 18(3), 1998, 305-24.
12. _. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law." Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 2000a, 45-76.
13. _. "The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy." American Law and Economics Review, 2(2), 2000b, 223-37.
14. Rubinstein, A. "An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident," in Applied Game Theory, edited by S. Brams, A. Schotter, and G. Schwöodiauer. Wüurzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1979, 406-13.