Playing without a rulebook: Optimal enforcement when individuals learn the penalty only by committing the crime

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 409-421

  Ben Shahar, Omri ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031232050     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00021-5     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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