Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 34, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1123-1139

  Van Gorder, Robert A ^a   Caputo, Michael R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Differential games; Envelope theorems; Open loop information structure; Stackelberg duopoly

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952009802     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2010.01.016     Document Type: Article

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