Dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop complete information

Journal of the Franklin Institute

Volumn 342, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 737-748

  Nie, Pu Yan ^a  

^a JINAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Discrete time dynamic models; Enforcement; Law; Open loop complete information; Stackelberg games

Indexed keywords

FEEDBACK; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; LAW ENFORCEMENT; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING;

DISCRETE TIME DYNAMIC MODELS; OPEN-LOOP COMPLETE FORMATION; OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; STAKELBERG GAMES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 26444541654     PISSN: 00160032     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfranklin.2005.04.005     Document Type: Article

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