The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 198-224

  Caputo, Michael R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Differential games; Envelope theorem; Nash equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 35148899738     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.004     Document Type: Article

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