Games with espionage

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 172-199

  Solan, Eilon ^a,b   Yariv, Leeat ^c  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Espionage; Information pricing; Semi correlated equilibria; Timing

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842554303     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00177-5     Document Type: Article

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