Models of vetoes and veto bargaining

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 7, Issue , 2004, Pages 409-435

  Cameron, Charles ^a   McCarty, Nolan ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive legislative relations; Gridlock; Presidents; Separation of powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142705902     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104810     Document Type: Review

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