The effect of capital market pressures on the association between R&D spending and CEO option compensation

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 273-300

  Cao, Jian ^a   Laksmana, Indrarini ^b  

^a FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b KENT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO option compensation; Earnings benchmarks; R D expenditures

Indexed keywords

EID: 77950444104     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-009-0146-7     Document Type: Article

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