The power of words: Argumentative persuasion in international negotiations

European Journal of International Relations

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 5-29

  Grobe, Christian ^a  

^a MCKINSEY AND COMPANY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Communicative action; Game theory; International negotiations; Persuasion; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 77649257698     PISSN: 13540661     EISSN: 14603713     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1354066109343989     Document Type: Article

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