Sovereign default and debt renegotiation

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 176-187

  Yue, Vivian Z ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Debt renegotiation; Recovery rate; Sovereign debt spreads; Sovereign default

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; DEBT CRISIS; ECONOMIC IMPACT; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; NUMERICAL MODEL; QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS; RISK ASSESSMENT; SOVEREIGNTY;

ARGENTINA;

EID: 77349097759     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.11.004     Document Type: Article

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