Models of sovereign debt: Partial versus general reputations

International Economic Review

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 55-70

  Cole, Harold L ^a   Kehoe, Patrick J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006644138     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527230     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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