Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 112, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 817-847

  Cooley, Thomas ^a   Marimon, Ramon ^b   Quadrini, Vincenzo ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENTREPRENEUR; FINANCIAL PROVISION; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS; INVESTMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 4544362915     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/421170     Document Type: Article

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