Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 47-72

  Weinschelbaum, Federico ^a   Wynne, José ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRÉS   (Argentina)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action clauses; International bankruptcy court; Moral hazard; Renegotiation; Sovereign debt

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL MARKET; COLLECTIVE ACTION; SOVEREIGNTY;

EID: 23844481601     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.09.007     Document Type: Article

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