Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of seniority

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 76, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 879-902

  Bolton, Patrick ^a   Jeanne, Olivier ^b  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; DEBT; LENDING BEHAVIOR; SOVEREIGNTY; WELFARE ECONOMICS; WILLINGNESS TO PAY;

EID: 67549134399     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00541.x     Document Type: Article

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