Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 147, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 213-233

  Way, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Broome; Instrumental reason; Kolodny; Object given and state given reasons; Rationality; Reasons; Setiya; Wide scope

Indexed keywords

EID: 76149110808     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9277-2     Document Type: Article

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