Because I want it

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 129-152

  Darwall, Stephen ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040030057     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052500002934     Document Type: Article

References (62)

1. Where 'desire' is understood in the broad sense, as any disposition an agent might have to bring something about. I shall generally follow this usage.
2. For earlier criticisms of this view, see Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). For more recent critiques, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Backgrounding Desire," Philosophical Review 99, no. 4 (1990): 565-92; Warren Quinn, "Putting Rationality in Its Place," in Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228-55; and T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 41-55.
3. For earlier criticisms of this view, see Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). For more recent critiques, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Backgrounding Desire," Philosophical Review 99, no. 4 (1990): 565-92; Warren Quinn, "Putting Rationality in Its Place," in Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228-55; and T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 41-55.
4. For earlier criticisms of this view, see Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). For more recent critiques, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Backgrounding Desire," Philosophical Review 99, no. 4 (1990): 565-92; Warren Quinn, "Putting Rationality in Its Place," in Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228-55; and T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 41-55.
5. For earlier criticisms of this view, see Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). For more recent critiques, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Backgrounding Desire," Philosophical Review 99, no. 4 (1990): 565-92; Warren Quinn, "Putting Rationality in Its Place," in Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228-55; and T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 41-55.
6. For earlier criticisms of this view, see Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). For more recent critiques, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Backgrounding Desire," Philosophical Review 99, no. 4 (1990): 565-92; Warren Quinn, "Putting Rationality in Its Place," in Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228-55; and T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 41-55.
7. For earlier criticisms of this view, see Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). For more recent critiques, see Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Backgrounding Desire," Philosophical Review 99, no. 4 (1990): 565-92; Warren Quinn, "Putting Rationality in Its Place," in Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228-55; and T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 41-55.
8. On this latter point, see Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 39-41.
9. Pettit and Smith, "Backgrounding Desire."
10. I take the term "deliberative field" from Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 193-207.
11. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, 29-30.
12. Nagel argues that this is true, for example, of moral and prudential reasons. Ibid., 29.
13. Or, at least, it is guaranteed that we ought to believe the truth on some matter if we have any beliefs on it at all. For discussion of the idea that belief has this "constitutive aim," and of whether desire does, see J. David Velleman, "The Possibility of Practical Reason," Ethics 106, no. 4 (1996): 707-26. A problem with the view in the text might be that even if belief's constitutive aim is correct representation, it cannot follow directly that we ought to believe truths (or not believe falsehoods), because such an 'ought' would have to be categorical, and for that to follow it would also have to be true that belief's aim is one we ought to have. An alternative picture might be to treat it as a conceptual truth that beliefs ought to be regulated by the truth (or the world), since, from the first-person point of view, deliberation about what to believe is no different from inquiry into what is true. Whatever the details, however, what seems clear is that it is of the nature of belief that it is regulated by something (truth, or the world) that is what it is independently of norms for belief. I am indebted here to some work by, and discussion with, Nishiten Shah.
14. As David Velleman puts it, "When someone believes a proposition . . . his acceptance of it is regulated in ways designed to promote acceptance of the truth," whereas, for example, when "someone assumes a proposition, he or his cognitive faculties are disposed to regulate his acceptance of it in ways designed to promote the ends of argument or inquiry," and so on. J. David Velleman, "The Guise of the Good," Noûs 16, no. 1 (1992): 14.
15. See, for example, Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 111-19. Smith cites Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 256-57; Platts attributes the idea to G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957).
16. See, for example, Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 111-19. Smith cites Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 256-57; Platts attributes the idea to G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957).
17. See, for example, Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 111-19. Smith cites Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 256-57; Platts attributes the idea to G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957).
18. See note 8 above.
19. The "value" at issue here is not "agent - relative value" (that is, not value to the agent-either value-as-the-agent-sees-it, or value from the agent's point of view, or benefit to the agent [the agent's good]), but rather what is called "agent-neutral value" or value period. For the distinction between "agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" generally, see Thomas Nagel, "The Limits of Objectivity," in Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), 97-139; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 164-88; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 3-14; Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, "Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes," Utilitas 7, no. 2 (1995): 319-25. For the relevance of this distinction to value in particular, see Amartya Sen, "Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 2 (1983): 113-32.
20. The "value" at issue here is not "agent - relative value" (that is, not value to the agent-either value-as-the-agent-sees-it, or value from the agent's point of view, or benefit to the agent [the agent's good]), but rather what is called "agent-neutral value" or value period. For the distinction between "agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" generally, see Thomas Nagel, "The Limits of Objectivity," in Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), 97-139; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 164-88; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 3-14; Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, "Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes," Utilitas 7, no. 2 (1995): 319-25. For the relevance of this distinction to value in particular, see Amartya Sen, "Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 2 (1983): 113-32.
21. The "value" at issue here is not "agent - relative value" (that is, not value to the agent-either value-as-the-agent-sees-it, or value from the agent's point of view, or benefit to the agent [the agent's good]), but rather what is called "agent-neutral value" or value period. For the distinction between "agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" generally, see Thomas Nagel, "The Limits of Objectivity," in Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), 97-139; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 164-88; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 3-14; Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, "Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes," Utilitas 7, no. 2 (1995): 319-25. For the relevance of this distinction to value in particular, see Amartya Sen, "Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 2 (1983): 113-32.
22. The "value" at issue here is not "agent - relative value" (that is, not value to the agent-either value-as-the-agent-sees-it, or value from the agent's point of view, or benefit to the agent [the agent's good]), but rather what is called "agent-neutral value" or value period. For the distinction between "agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" generally, see Thomas Nagel, "The Limits of Objectivity," in Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), 97-139; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 164-88; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 3-14; Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, "Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes," Utilitas 7, no. 2 (1995): 319-25. For the relevance of this distinction to value in particular, see Amartya Sen, "Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 2 (1983): 113-32.
23. The "value" at issue here is not "agent - relative value" (that is, not value to the agent-either value-as-the-agent-sees-it, or value from the agent's point of view, or benefit to the agent [the agent's good]), but rather what is called "agent-neutral value" or value period. For the distinction between "agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" generally, see Thomas Nagel, "The Limits of Objectivity," in Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), 97-139; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 164-88; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 3-14; Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, "Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes," Utilitas 7, no. 2 (1995): 319-25. For the relevance of this distinction to value in particular, see Amartya Sen, "Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 2 (1983): 113-32.
24. The "value" at issue here is not "agent - relative value" (that is, not value to the agent-either value-as-the-agent-sees-it, or value from the agent's point of view, or benefit to the agent [the agent's good]), but rather what is called "agent-neutral value" or value period. For the distinction between "agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" generally, see Thomas Nagel, "The Limits of Objectivity," in Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), 97-139; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 164-88; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 3-14; Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, "Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes," Utilitas 7, no. 2 (1995): 319-25. For the relevance of this distinction to value in particular, see Amartya Sen, "Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 2 (1983): 113-32.
25. Using 'desire' in the broad functionalist sense given by its direction of fit. So understood, desires will include many things that could usefully be distinguished in a more fine-grained analysis: intentions, instances of norm acceptance, emotions, and so on.
26. Unless, of course, the satisfaction of desire has value in itself, but, as I discuss further in Section IV, this seems implausible when we reflect on desire's direction of fit. By a "subjectively reasonable" view of the world, I mean whatever beliefs are supported by evidence available to the person.
27. That is, they fail to give anyone what we might call abjective reasons. They would still give anyone who reasonably thought they tracked real value subjective reasons (that is, evidence of objective reasons).
28. Unless, of course, it matters period that it matters to her (or to someone else). I discuss this case four paragraphs below.
29. For an important discussion of these matters in a more general context, see Nagel, The View from Nowhere.
30. For discussion of this distinction between "substantive" and merely "formal" aims in relation to belief and desire, see Velleman, "The Possibility of Practical Reason," 714-15.
31. In "The Guise of the Good," Velleman suggests that the "attainable" might provide a substantive constitutive aim for desire; however, that would provide no help in this context.
32. Since Moore can be read as giving special emphasis to the irreducible normativity of value (cf. his famous "open question" argument), it might seem odd that his views could underwrite the picture we are currently considering. The reason they might, as is now explained in the text, is that Moore's idea appears to be that value is normative, not for choice, desire, or action in the first instance, but for states of affairs. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, ed. Thomas Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 34.
33. Actually, this is insufficient, since assuming p also is a way of holding p true. What makes truth normative for belief is that belief is the kind of holding true that responds to truth (or evidence of it) in belief's distinctive way.
34. As Velleman puts it, "desire takes its propositional object as representing facienda -things that aren't the case but are to be brought about," whereas "belief takes its propositional object as representing facta - things that are the case and in virtue of which the proposition is true." Velleman, "The Possibility of Practical Reason," 707.
35. I discuss this point in Darwall, Impartial Reason, 15-17, 43-50. For more extensive discussion, see John Broome, "Normative Requirements," Ratio 12, no. 4 (1999): 398-419.
36. I discuss this point in Darwall, Impartial Reason, 15-17, 43-50. For more extensive discussion, see John Broome, "Normative Requirements," Ratio 12, no. 4 (1999): 398-419.
37. On this point, see Patricia Greenspan, "Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives," Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 10 (1975): 259-76; and R. M. Hare, "Wanting: Some Pitfalls," in Robert Binkley, Richard Bronaugh, and Ausonio Marras, eds., Agent, Action, and Reason (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1971).
38. On this point, see Patricia Greenspan, "Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives," Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 10 (1975): 259-76; and R. M. Hare, "Wanting: Some Pitfalls," in Robert Binkley, Richard Bronaugh, and Ausonio Marras, eds., Agent, Action, and Reason (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1971).
39. I discuss this at greater length in Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 6.
40. This is Michael Smith's formulation, following Mark Platts; Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, 116.
41. Although this interpretation marks a gain in coherence, it may not mark a gain in clarity. Talk of the phenomenology of, say, color experience may be thought to have a clear sense that is lacking here. How, exactly, do things seem when it seems as if there is a standard to which the world must fit?
42. Such a view would be an instance of "substantive realism," as Christine Korsgaard calls it. For her discussion, see Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 35-37.
43. Sometimes we say things like "It should not happen that children go to bed hungry," even when there is nothing we can do that could prevent it. However, such talk can be understood in terms of norms for attitudes, if not for actions (e.g., "It is lamentable [undesirable, shameful, etc.] that children go to bed hungry").
44. Something like this is suggested by Scanlon's discussion of desire in the "directed-attention sense." Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 39.
45. This is, of course, the problem that Gilbert Harman raised in Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 3-10.
46. I think Scanlon does not sufficiently appreciate this difficulty in Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 55-72, and, in any case, that the considerations adduced in Section VI provide a better account of how considerations of "the reasonable" can provide reasons for acting.
47. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, ed. Frederick Neuhouser, trans. Michael Baur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 29-52.
48. Ibid., 32. Christine Korsgaard makes a similar point in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativitiy, 139-43.
49. Ibid., 32. Christine Korsgaard makes a similar point in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativitiy, 139-43.
50. Compare here Adam Smith's contrast between the distinctively human capacity for independent, second-personal "exchange" as opposed to the attempts of animals to gain the goodwill of humans "by every servile and fawning attention." Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1981), 1:26.
51. Although sympathy is not required, empathy, placing oneself in the other's shoes, is. Arguably, however, empathy is required for second-personal reciprocal recognition in the first place. For the differences between empathy and sympathy, see Stephen Darwall, "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," Philosophical Studies 89, no. 2 (1998): 261-82.
52. Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (On the law of nature and nations), trans. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), I.i, secs. 2-6, pp. 4-7; I.vi, sec. 4, p. 89. discuss this aspect of Pufendorf's views in Stephen Darwall, "Autonomy in Modern Natural Law," unpublished.
53. Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (On the law of nature and nations), trans. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), I.i, secs. 2-6, pp. 4-7; I.vi, sec. 4, p. 89. discuss this aspect of Pufendorf's views in Stephen Darwall, "Autonomy in Modern Natural Law," unpublished.
54. This claim is implicit in Pufendorf's distinction between coercion and being under an obligation. Many things can "influence the will to turn to one side" or the other, but other evils "bear down the will as by some natural weight, and on their removal [the will] returns of itself to its former indifference." Obligation, however, "affects the will morally," so that it "is forced of itself to weigh its own actions, and to judge itself worthy of some censure, unless it conforms to a prescribed rule." In effect, Pufendorf here invokes a notion of internal blame or censure, that is, accepting blame as justified (blaming oneself in authorizing the view of the other who blames one). Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, I.vi, sec. 5, p. 91.
55. There may seem to be many obvious counterexamples to this statement. Most vividly, what about orders to children or to slaves? It is important to distinguish, again, the pure claim from any attempt simply to cause a certain action or response. Claims are issued with the aim of getting a certain response in virtue of a recognition that the validity of the claim creates a reason so to respond. Thus, a pure order is issued to gain a response by virtue of a recognition that the validity of the order (one's authority to issue such an order) gives a reason. By their very nature, then, claims are issued to beings who are implicitly regarded as competent to recognize their valid, reason-giving character and to freely act on them. Of course, one can issue a claim even if one does not believe that the addressee is thus competent -the point is that one regards or treats him as though he were. Frequently, of course - for example, with children - this is done to insinuate proleptically the very recognition on the addressee's part that is necessary for the claim to "come off." Still, the suggestion that participants in any second-personal claim-making implicitly regard each other as (equally) free and rational may seem implausible. What, again, about masters and slaves? Here we should recall Hegel on "lordship and bondage." Hegel claims that there is a contradiction in the master's second-personal address since he asserts a superiority that is belied by the recognition he seeks from the slave. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 111-19. Any pure order presupposes a free recognition of the validity of the order. If, of course, the master can expect that the slave will freely respect the authority his order presupposes, then no contradiction need be involved. However, see the next paragraph.
56. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 9
57. Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 246.
58. Although I agree with John Broome, and against Korsgaard, that, taken by itself, instrumental reasoning does not entail that the agent's desires or will provide reasons, as I argued in Section III. See Broome, "Normative Requirements," 417-19.
59. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 95 (Ak. p. 448).
60. See note 34 above.
61. "Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)." Kant, Groundwork, 89 (Ak. p. 441).
62. "Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Kant, Practical Philosophy, 164 (Ak. p. 31).