Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory

Economic Theory

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 119-156

  Herings, P Jean Jacques ^a   Peeters, Ronald ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Equilibrium computation; Homotopy; Nash equilibrium; Non cooperative games

Indexed keywords

EID: 75749089653     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0441-5     Document Type: Article

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