Communication in repeated monetary policy games

International Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 228-243

  Turdaliev, Nurlan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR   (Canada)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Communication; Monetary policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 75149125126     PISSN: 10590560     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2009.04.003     Document Type: Article

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