Central Bank transparency in theory and practice

Journal of Macroeconomics

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 760-789

  Demertzis, Maria ^a   Hughes Hallett, Andrew ^b  

^a DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK   (Netherlands)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central Bank; Economic and political transparency; Inflation and output gap performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247173961     PISSN: 01640704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2005.06.002     Document Type: Article

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