Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1163-1188

  Norman, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCESSIBILITY; EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT; PRICE DYNAMICS; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 7444226447     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00318     Document Type: Article

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