Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: General cost functions

Economic Theory

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 189-198

  Dearden, James A ^a  

^a LEHIGH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032220188     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050217     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Congressional Budget Office: Paying for Highways, Airways, and Waterways: How Can Users be Charged? Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1992
2. Dearden, J.: Efficiency and Exclusion in Collective Action Allocations. Forthcoming in: Economic Design (1997)
3. Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1991
4. Laffont, J. -J.: Fundamentals of Public Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988
5. Littlechild, S. C., Owen, G.: A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case. Management Science 20, 370-372 (1973)
6. Mailath, G., Postlewaite, A.: Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents. Review of Economic Studies 57, 351-367 (1973)
7. Moulin, H.: On the Fair and Coalition-Strategyproof Allocations of Private Goods. In: Binmore, K. Kirman, A., Tani, P. (eds.) Frontiers in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1993
8. Moulin, H.: Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods. Review of Economic Studies 61, 305-325 (1994)
9. Rob, R.: Pollution Claim Settlements Under Private Information. Journal of Economic Theory 47, 307-333 (1989)