Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 153-174

  Dearden, James A ^a  

^a 621 Taylor St Rauch Bus Ctr L   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Game theory; Mechanism design; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008345269     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00008-5     Document Type: Article

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