Public-good provision with many participants

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 589-614

  Hellwig, Martin F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN ANALYSIS; COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; PUBLIC GOODS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0042267291     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00257     Document Type: Article

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