The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 153-171

  Ledyard, John O ^a   Palfrey, Thomas R ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Interim efficiency; Public goods; Simple mechanisms; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036176621     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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10. Dominant Strategy
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