Application of game theory to fisheries over three decades

Fisheries Research

Volumn 102, Issue 1-2, 2010, Pages 1-8

  Bailey, Megan ^a   Rashid Sumaila, U ^a   Lindroos, Marko ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Cooperative management; Dynamic externality; Fisheries economics; Game theory; Shared stocks

Indexed keywords

EID: 73549105213     PISSN: 01657836     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.fishres.2009.11.003     Document Type: Review

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