A principal-agent analysis of fisheries

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 158, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 276-285

  Jensen, Frank ^a   Vestergaard, Niels ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036019284     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456022975376     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Commercial fisheries under price uncertainty
2. Minimum information management in fisheries
3. An optimal program for managing common property resources with congestion externalities
4. Coastal states, distant fishing nations and extended jurisdiction: A principal-agent analysis
5. A critical review of individual quota as a device in fisheries management
6. Testing for input substitution in a regulated fishery
7. Regulating a polluting firm under asymmetric information
8. To tell the truth: Imperfect information and optimal pollution control
9. Regulation of pollution with asymmetric information
10. Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty
11. Economics of production from natural resources
12. On models of commercial fishing
13. Optimal regulation under asymmetric information
14. The economics of fisheries law enforcement