Eliciting coordination with rebates

Transportation Science

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 473-492

  Maillé, Patrick ^a   Stier Moses, Nicolás E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ EUROPÉENNE DE BRETAGNE   (France)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Network pricing; Price of anarchy; Stackelberg games; Subsidies as incentives; Wardrop equilibrium

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; TRANSPORTATION ROUTES;

NETWORK PRICING; PRICE OF ANARCHY; STACKELBERG GAMES; SUBSIDIES AS INCENTIVES; WARDROP EQUILIBRIUM;

COSTS;

EID: 73349131092     PISSN: 00411655     EISSN: 15265447     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/trsc.1090.0287     Document Type: Article

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