Contracting in the presence of judicial agency

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2009, Pages

  Bond, Philip ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Appeal process; Bribes; Contracting; Corruption; Courts; Extortion; Judges

Indexed keywords

EID: 73149096053     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1430     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale. Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts. Economic Theory, 2(1):1-26, January 1992.
2. Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, and Andrew Postlewaite. Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 23: 662-684, 2007.
3. Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, and Andrew Postlewaite. Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? Working Paper, 2009.
4. Ian Ayres. Judicial corruption: Extortion and bribery. Denver University Law Review, 74, 1231-1253 1997.
5. Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, and Casper G. de Vries. Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction. American Economic Review, 83(1):289-294, March 1993.
6. Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, and Casper G. de Vries. The all-pay auction with complete information. Economic Theory, 8:291-305, 1996.
7. Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, and Casper G. de Vries. Comparative analysis of litigation systems: an auction-theoretic approach. Economic Journal, 115:583601, July 2005.
8. Gary S Becker and George J Stigler. Law enforcement, malfeasance , and the compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1):1-18, January 1974.
9. Antonio E Bernardo, Eric Talley, and Ivo Welch. A theory of legal presumptions. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16(1):1-49, April 2000.
10. B Douglas Bernheim and Michael D Whinston. Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity. American Economic Review, 88(4):902-932, September 1998.
11. Richard T Boylan. What do prosecutors maximize? Evidence from the careers of U.S. attorneys. American Law and Economics Review, 7(2):379-402, Fall 2005.
12. Ronald H Coase. The nature of the firm. Economica, New Series, 4:386-405, 1937.
13. David Friedman. Why not hang them all: The virtues of inefficient punishment. Journal of Political Economy, 107(6(2)):S259-S269, December 1999.
14. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer. Legal origins. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002.
15. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer. The rise of the regulatory state. Journal of Economic Literature, 41(2):401-425, June 2003.
16. Oliver Hart. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford University Press, 1995.
17. Joel S Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufman. Seize the state, seize the day: State capture, corruption, and influence in transition. World Bank Policy Research Paper 2444, 2000.
18. M. H. Hoeflich. Regulation of judicial misconduct from late antiquity to the early middle ages. Law and History Review, 2(1):79-104, Spring 1984.
19. Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom. Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7(Special Issue):24-52, 1991.
20. Giovanni Immordino and Marco Pagano. Legal standards, enforcement and corruption. Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.
21. Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarŕee, and Sungho Yun. Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils. RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
22. Patrick Legros and Andrew F Newman. Courts, contracts, and interference. European Economic Review, 46(4-5):734-744, May 2002.
23. James Lindgren. The theory, history, and practice of the bribery-extortion distinction. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 141, May 1993.
24. Arun S. Malik. Avoidance, screening and optimum enforcement. RAND Journal of Economics, 21(3):341-353, Autumn 1990.
25. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole. Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66:83-114, January 1999.
26. John McMillan and Pablo Zoido. How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(4):69-92, Fall 2004.
27. Paul R Milgrom. Employment contracts, influence activities, and efficient organization design. Journal of Political Economy, 96(1):42-60, February 1988.
28. Vai-Lam Mui. Contracting in the shadow of a corrupt court. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 155:249-283, 1999.
29. Mancur Olson. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review, 87(3):567-576, September 1993.
30. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. Corruption and optimal law enforcement. Journal of Public Economics, 81(1):1-24, July 2001.
31. Richard A. Posner. Overcoming Law. Harvard University Press, 1995.
32. Susan Rose-Ackerman. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
33. ChrisWilliam Sanchirico. A primary-activity approach to proof burdens. Journal of Legal Studies, 37(1):273313, January 2008.
34. Ilya Segal. Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66(1):57-82, January 1999.
35. Ron Siegel. All-pay contests. Econometrica, (1):71-92, January 2009.
36. Herbert A Simon. The sciences of the artificial. MIT Press, 1981.
37. Kathryn E. Spier. Incomplete contracts and signalling. RAND Journal of Economics, 23(3):432-443, Autumn 1992.
38. Kathryn E. Spier. Settlement bargaining and the design of damage awards. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 10(1):84-95, 1994.
39. Jean Tirole. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2(2):181-214, Autumn 1986.
40. Oliver E Williamson. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Impli- cations. Free Press, 1975.