Contracting in the shadow of a corrupt court

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 155, Issue 2, 1999, Pages

  Vai Lam, Mui ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033478740     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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