Incentive compatible double auction mechanism in electricity market

Dianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation of Electric Power Systems

Volumn 28, Issue 18, 2004, Pages 7-15

  Wang, Xianjia ^a   Yin, Hong ^a  

^a WUHAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Double auction; Electricity market; Incentive compatible; Transaction cost; Translate into one price

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ELECTRIC LOAD DISPATCHING; REAL TIME SYSTEMS;

COMPETITIVE BIDDING; DOUBLE AUCTION; ELECTRICITY MARKET; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MARGINAL COSTS; NUMERAL SIMULATION; TRANSACTION COST;

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

EID: 10044283236     PISSN: 10001026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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