Asymmetric Demand Information in Uniform and Discriminatory Call Auctions: An Experimental Analysis Motivated by Electricity Markets

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 125-144

  Abbink, Klaus ^a   Brandts, Jordi ^b   McDaniel, Tanga ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b Barcelona)   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037273684     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022202929469     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Abbink, K., J. Brandts, and P. Pezanis-Christou. 2002. "The Spanish Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Analysis." Working paper, Institut d'Anlisi Econmica, Barcelona.
2. Abbink K., and A. Sadrieh. 1995. "RatImage-Research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments." SFB Discussion Paper B-325, University of Bonn.
3. Goswami G., T. H. Noe, and M. J. Rebello. 1996. "Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions." The Review of Financial Studies 9(3): 757-785.
4. Green, R., and T. McDaniel. 1999. "Modeling the Review of the Electricity Trading Arrangements: A Model of Forward Trading and the Balancing Mechanism." Department of Applied Economics Working Paper, 0003(a), University of Cambridge.
5. Kagel, J., and D. Levin. 2001. "Independent Private Value Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions." Econometrica 69: 413-454.
6. Kahn, A., P. Crampton, R. Porter, and R. Tabors. 2001. "Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing?" Blue Ribbon Panel Report commissioned by the California Power Exchange, January 23. Also published in The Electricity Journal, 14(6) (July).
7. McCabe, K., S. Rassenti, and V. Smith. 1990. "Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple-Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions." American Economic Review 80: 1276-1283.
8. Miller, G., and C. Plott. 1985. "Revenue-Generating Properties of Sealed-Bid Auctions: An Experimental Analysis of One-Price and Discriminative Processes." In Research in Experimental Economics 3, edited by V. Smith. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 159-181.
9. Offer. 1998. Review of Electricity Trading Arrangements: Interim Conclusiom. June, Birmingham, England: Office of Electricity Regulation.
10. Offer. 1999. The New Electricity Trading Arrangements: Vol. 1. July, Birmingham, England: Office of Electricity Regulation.
11. Rassenti, S., V. Smith, and B. Wilson. 2000. "Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand-side Bidding." Working paper, University of Arizona.
12. Rassenti, S., V. Smith, and B. Wilson. 2003. "Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets." Journal of Regulatory Economics 23(2): 109-123.
13. Staropoli, C., D. Finon, J.-M. Glachant, C. Jullien, R. Quatrain, S. Robin, and B. Ruffieux. 2000. "Modifying Industry Structure or Market Institution? An Experimental Analysis of the Reform of the English Electricity Pool." Working paper, Université Paris I.
14. Telser, L. 1978. Economic Theory and the Core. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
15. Van Boening, M., and N. Wilcox. 1996. "Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster." American Economic Review 86(3): 461-477.
16. Vickrey, W. 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders." Journal of Finance 16: 8-37.