Political rights and the cost of debt

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 95, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 202-226

  Qi, Yaxuan ^a   Roth, Lukas ^b   Wald, John K ^c  

^a John Molson School of Business   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO   (United States)

Author keywords

Cost of debt; Creditor rights; Cross listing; Freedom of the press; Political institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 72149096795     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.004     Document Type: Article

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