The dynamics of the European union legal order: An increasingly coherent framework of action and interpretation

European Constitutional Law Review

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 117-142

  Wessel, Ramses A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Common Foreign and Security Policy; European Commission; European Communities; European Council; European Union; High representative; Intergovernmentalism; Judicial Review; Legal Instruments; Pillar Structure; Political Committee; Treaty of Lisbon

Indexed keywords

EID: 71049192201     PISSN: 15740196     EISSN: 17445515     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1574019609001175     Document Type: Article

References (144)

1. Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (Louisiana State University Press 1969) p. 7.
2. See for an analyses with regard to the 'second pillar': 'The CFSP under the EU Constitutional Treaty - Issues of Depillarization', Editorial Comments, CMLR (2005) p. 325-329.
3. See for a recent contribution Chr. W. Herrmann, 'Much Ado about Pluto? The "Unity of the Legal Order of the European Union" Revisited', EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2007/05.
4. which also appeared in M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law - Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2008) p. 19-51.
5. Cf. also new Art. 47 of the post Lisbon TEU: 'The Union shall have legal personality'.
6. See for D. Curtin and I. Dekker, 'The EU as a "Layered" International Organiza tion: Institutional Unity in Disguise', in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) p. 83-136
7. as well as their 'The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: Some Reflections on Vertical Unity-In-Diversity', in N. Walker, et al. (eds.) Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Oxford, Hart Publishers 2002) p. 59-78.
8. Obviously, the development of Europe's foreign and security policy goes back to the years of the European Political Cooperation before the CFSP, which meant that CFSP did not have to start from scratch. See for instance M.E. Smith, Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004).
9. D.M. Curtin,. 'The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces', CMLR (1993) p. 17-69.
10. Compare for a political science perspective also S. Stetter, EU Foreign and Interior Policies: Cross-Pillar Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty (London/New York, Routledge 2007).
11. See R. Gosalbo Bono (Director of the Legal Service of the Council), 'Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order', CMLR (2006) p. 337-394, who even refers to 'progressive supranationalism' in relation to the development of CFSP (at p. 349).
12. and more extensively R.A. Wessel, 'The EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Fifteen Years after Maastricht: A Constitutional Momentum?', in H.-G. Ehrhart, S. Jaberg, B. Rinke and J. Waldmann (Hrsg.), Die Europäische Union im 21. Jahrhundert. Theorie und Praxis europäischer Außen-, Sicherheits- und Friedenspolitik (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozial-wissenschaften 2007) p. 302-316.
13. See E. Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) p. 5.
14. Irrespective of the fact that - as in the 2004 Constitutional Treaty - at least one of the current pillars (CFSP) will still be clearly recognizable. Cf. M. Cremona, 'A Constitutional Basis for Effective External Action? An Assessment of the Provisions on EU External Action in the Constitutional Treaty', EUI Working Paper, LAW No. 2006/30.
15. as well as her 'The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action', CMLR (2005) p. 1347.
16. Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Com mission [2005] ECR II-3353, para. 156.
17. See D. Spence, 'The Commission and the Common Foreign and Security Policy', in D. Spence (ed.), The European Commission, 3rd edn. (London, John Harper 2006).
18. Spence quotes former Commissioner Chris Patten on this issue to provide the reason: 'Some of my staff [...] would have preferred me to have a grab for foreign policy, trying to bring as much of it as possible into the orbit of the Commission. This always seemed to me to be wrong in principle and likely to be counterproductive in practice. Foreign policy should not in my view [...] be treated on a par with the single market. It is inherently different' (at p. 360).
19. S. Duke and S. Vanhoonacker, 'Administrative Governance in CFSP', EFA Rev. (2006) p. 163-182 at 166.
20. S. Duke, 'The Commission and the CFSP', EIPA Working Paper 2006/W/01 (2006), at p. 10.
21. Cf. F. Cameron, 'Where the European Commission Comes in: From the Single European Act to Maastricht', in E. Regelsberger, Ph. De Schoutheete and W. Wessels (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1997) at p. 101, who at that time referred to the Commission as the 'sixteenth' member state in CFSP.
22. F. Cameron. Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Ibid., at p. 12.
23. S. Duke, 'The European External Action Service: A Diplomatic Service in the Making', CFSP Fo r u m (2004).
24. See on consistency and coherence C. Hillion, 'Tous pour un, un our tous! Coherence in the Exter nal Relations of the European Union', in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2008) p. 10-36.
25. and R.A. Wessel, 'The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External Relations', CML Rev. (2000) p. 1135-1171
26. and 'Fragmentation in the Governance of EU External Relations: Legal Institutional Dilemmas and the New Constitution for Europe', in J.W. de Zwaan et al. (eds.), The European Union - An Ongoing Process of Integration, Liber Amicorum Fred Kellermann (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2004) p. 123-140.
27. G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 'The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union', EFA Rev. (2000), p. 257-282 at 261.
28. Denza, supra n. 9 at p. 10.
29. Duke and Vanhoonacker, supra n. 13, at p. 167.
30. See for instance M.E. Smith, Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation of Coopera tion (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004) p. 77-84.
31. One of the standard works is S. Nuttall, European Political Cooperation (Oxford, Oxford Uni versity Press 1992).
32. He defined the 'consultation reflex' as an 'automatic reflex of consultation brought about by frequent personal contacts with opposite numbers from the other Member States' (p. 312).
33. See also P. de Schoutheete, La cooperation politique européenne (Paris, Nathan 1980).
34. But see already S. Duke, 'The Linchpin COPS', 2005/W/05 EIPA Working Paper, Maastricht 2005.
35. See also S. Duke and S. Vanhoonacker, supra n. 13 at p. 164
36. and in general: K. Glarbo, 'Wideawake diplomacy: reconstructing the common foreign and security policy of the European Union', Journal of European Public Policy (1999) p. 634-651.
37. A.E. Juncos and Chr. Reynolds, 'The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow', EFA Rev. (2007) p. 127-147 at 135.
38. 'Brusselizing the CFSP means that while the relevant competencies do remain ultimately at the disposal of the Member States, the formulation and implementation of policy will be increasingly Europeanized and Busselized by functionaries and services housed permanently at Brussels'. See Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, supra n. 18 at p. 261.
39. Cf. also E. Regelsberger, 'The EU as an Actor in Foreign and Security Policy: Some Key Features of CFSP in an Historical perspective', 4 CFSP Forum (2007) p. 1-8 at p. 3.
40. Juncos and Reynolds, supra n. 25 at p. 145.
41. Ibid., at p. 141.
42. Cf. A.E. Juncos and K. Pomorska, 'Playing the Brussels Game: Strategic Socialisation in the CFSP Council Working Groups', European Integration Online Papers (2006).
43. Duke and Vanhoonacker, supra n. 13 at p. 169-172.
44. See Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, supra n. 18 at p. 265.
45. Ibid., at p. 260.
46. Cf. ibid., at p. 268.
47. See on the close co-operation between the HR and the Commission, Duke, supra n. 14 at p. 13-15.
48. Cf. Spence, supra n. 12 at p. 368.
49. S. Duke, supra n. 14 at p. 16.
50. and Duke and Vanhoonacker, supra n. 13, at p. 168.
51. and Spence, supra n. 12 at p. 369 respectively.
52. D. Beach, 'The Unseen Hand in Treaty Reform Negotiations: The Role and Influence of the Council Secretariat', 3 Journal of European Public Policy (2004) p. 408-439 at 409-411.
53. Cf. Spence, supra n. 12 at p. 368.
54. and Duke and Vanhoonacker, supra n. 13 at p.176.
55. H. Dijkstra, 'The Council Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy', European Foreign Affairs Review (2008) p. 149-166 at p. 149.
56. In general on the functions of the secretariat: T. Christiansen, 'Out of the Shadows: The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers', Journal of Legislative Studies (2002) p. 80-97.
57. T. Christiansen and S. Vanhoonacker, 'At a Critical Juncture? Change and Continuity in the Institutional Development of the Council Secretariat', West European Politics (2008) p. 751-770.
58. A. Mauer, D. Kietz and Chr. Völkel, 'Interinstitutional Agreements in the CFSP: Parliamentarization through the Back Door?', EFA Rev. (2005) p. 175-195.
59. Cf. also Th. Frish, 'Der Hohe Vertreter für die GASP. Aufgaben und erste Schritte', SWP- AP 3136 (Ebenhausen, 2000) p. 25-26.
60. See for a recent overview D. Thym, 'Beyond Parliament's Reach The Role of the European Parliament in the CFSP', EFA Rev. (2006) p. 109-127.
61. U. Diedrichs, 'The European Parliament in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player?', 2 The Inter national Spectator (2004) p. 31-46 at p. 36.
62. Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 16th edn., June 2007, Rules 85 and 86.
63. Mauer, Kietz and Völkel, supra n. 39 at p. 194, who even argue that '[t]he EP acts as an autonomous supranational actor which pursues its own reform agenda over the long-term and has various means of incrementally impacting the reform process, especially in the informal arena'.
64. See K. Oppermann and A. Höse, 'Public Opinion and the Development of the European Security and Defence Policy', EFA Rev. (2007) p. 149-167 at p. 167: 'We have come to a point where European defence in both constitutional as well as operational terms is transferring from an ab stract project to an increasingly tangible undertaking touching upon issues in which people want to have a say.'
65. See more in general S. Duke, 'Peculiarities in the Institutionalisation of CFSP and ESDP', in S. Blockmans (ed.), The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2008) p. 75-105.
66. Duke and Vanhoonacker, supra n. 13 at p. 176.
67. Including the information society, research policy, enterprise, pensions, education and voca tion training, combating social exclusion and sustainable development. See D. Trubek, P. Cottrel and M. Nance, 'Soft Law', 'Hard Law', and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity, Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/05, 19.
68. See on the use of soft law instruments in Community law also L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2004).
69. See on the OMC for instance the special issue of 2 European Journal of Public Policy (2004).
70. Cf. also the Commission's White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428 final, Brussels, 27 July 2001.
71. R.A. Wessel, The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999) Chapter 5
72. and more recently in C. Hillion and R.A. Wessel, 'Restraining External Competences of Member States under CFSP', in M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law - Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2008) p. 79-121. Parts of this contribution have been based on this publication.
73. On the possible influence of the general loyalty obligation in Art. 10 EC on CFSP obligations also Hillion and Wessel, supra n. 49. See also infra.
74. The publication in the Official Journal of CFSP autonomous acts is decided on a case-by- case basis, by unanimous decision of the Council or the Coreper: see Art. 17 of the Council Rules of Procedure; OJ [2006] L 285.
75. On CFSP Joint Actions specifically, see A. Dashwood, 'The Law and Practice of CFSP Joint Actions', in Cremona and de Witte, supra n. 3 at p. 53-77
76. F. Dehousse, 'La politique étrangère et de sécurité commune', in J.-V. Louis and M. Dony (eds.), Relations Extérieures - Commentaire J. Mégret, Le droit de la CE et de l'Union européenne (Bruxelles, Institut d'Etudes Européennes 2005) p. 441 at p. 475
77. P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2006) p. 399 et seq.
78. In the same vein, EU Common Strategies, envisaged in Art. 13 EU, bind not only the EU institutions but also the member states. For instance the European Council 1999 Common Strategy on Ukraine provided that the Council, the Commission and member states shall review, according to their powers and capacities, existing actions, programmes, instruments, and policies to ensure their consistency with that Common Strategy; see pt 41, Common Strategy on Ukraine; OJ [1999] L 331/1.
79. In this regard, see M. Brkan, 'Exploring the EU competence in CFSP: Logic or contradic tion?', Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2006) p. 173; cf. the current position of the member states, as reflected in the 'Draft IGC Mandate', annexed to the Presidency Conclusions, 21-22 June 2007, and particularly the insistence on the specificity of the CFSP in footnotes 6 and 22.
80. Gosalbo Bono, supra n. 8 at p. 378.
81. Irrespective of the fact that the original provision of the Constitutional Treaty concerning the primacy of (all) EU law (Art. I-6) will not be inserted into the TEU on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty. There is a declaration on primacy, but this merely refers to previous case-law of the ECJ, which of course does not relate to CFSP.
82. Nevertheless, most commentators have argued that there are many reasons (including the special nature of CFSP, the general absence of ECJ jurisdiction, the relation with established case- law and the probable absence of direct effect) not to apply the principle of primacy to CFSP. See in particular A. Dashwood, 'The Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/ European Community', CML Rev (2005) p. 355 at p. 363 and 379.
83. as well as his 'The EU Constitution: What will Really Change?', Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2005) p. 33 at p. 34.
84. See also Editorial Comment, CMLR, supra n. 2 at p. 327.
85. In this respect, see the Declaration on Primacy envisaged in footnote 1 of the 2007 'Draft IGC Mandate, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions, 21-22 June 2007.
86. It is admitted that in cases such as Simmenthal (Case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629) the Court took the special nature of Community law as a starting point.
87. Case C-355/04 P, Segi and Others v. Council [2007] ECR I-1657, para. 52.
88. Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council, Judgment of 20 May 2008 (a.k.a. 'Small Arms and Light Weapons'). See also infra.
89. See OJ C 115/10, 14.5.2005.
90. Para. 60. See also para. 33, where the Court holds that it is its 'task [...] to ensure that acts [...] which, by their nature, are capable of having legal effects, do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community' (emphasis added).
91. The question remains how the Court will deal with this after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. After all, as we have seen the new TEU Art. 24, para. 1 explicitly excludes 'the adoption of legislative acts' in the CFSP area. An obvious solution may be that even non-legislative acts may have legal effects.
92. Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commis sion, para. 156.
93. Denza, supra n. 9 at p. 16.
94. See more specifically on this point also D.M. Curtin and R.A. Wessel, 'Rechtseenheid van de Europese Unie? De rol van het Hof van Justitie als constitutionele rechter' [Legal Unity in the European Union: The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court], 10 SEW Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht (2008) p. 371-378.
95. See ; the Yusuf and Kadi cases discussed below form an example.
96. See new Art. 275 TFEU. Another exception is the (already existing) possibility of the Court to rule on the borderline between foreign policy and other measures (Art. 40 new TEU). At the same time the new provision on personal data protection in CFSP matters is excluded of the Court's jurisdiction (Art. 24).
97. See also A. Hinarejos, 'Judicial Control of CFSP in the Constitution: A Cherry Worth Picking?', in P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Yearbook of European Law 2006 (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007) p. 363.
98. See Art. 2 EU. On the interpretation of the acquis communautaire see for instance S. Weatherill, 'Safeguearding the acquis communautaire', in T. Heukels, N. Blokker and M. Brus (eds.), The Euro pean Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1998) p. 153.
99. or C. Curti Gialdino, 'Some Reflections of the Acquis Communautaire', CMLR (2005) p. 1089.
100. See recently on the role played by Art. 47 R.H. van Ooik, 'Cross-Pillar Litigation Before the ECJ: Demarcation of Community and Union Competences', EuConst (2008) p. 399-419
101. and A. Dashwood, 'Article 47 TEU and the Relationship between First and Second Pillar Competences', in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), The Law and Practice of EU External Relations - Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2008) p. 70-103.
102. Case C-124/95, Centro-Com [1997] ECR I-81, para. 41.
103. Case C-170/96, Commission v . Council [1998] ECR I-2763, paras. 15-16.
104. Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council ('Environmental Criminal Law'). 2005] ECR I-7879.
105. This was not the case in a similar situation in the Ship-Source Pollution case, where the Frame work Decision prescribed the type and level of the criminal sanctions, which went beyond the scope of Art. 175 EC; Case C-440/05 Commission v. Council [2007] ECR I-9097.
106. Joined Cases C-317/0 and C-318/04 European Parliament v . Council [2006] ECR I-4721.
107. Case C-91/05, supra n. 60.
108. In Cases T-349/99 Miskovic and T-350/99 Karic, the Court of First Instance missed the opportunity when the Council amended the decision challenged by two individuals who had been refused visa on the basis of a CFSP act.
109. Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-91/05, 19 Sept. 2007.
110. More extensively: Van Ooik, supra n. 70, as well as C. Hillion and R.A. Wessel, 'Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after ECOWAS: Clarification of Continued Fuzziness?', CMLR (2009) p. 551-586.
111. and F. Hoffmeister, 'Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und andere Politikbereiche', Europarecht, Beiheft 2 (2008) p. 55-101.
112. See earlier R. Baratta, 'Overlaps between European Community Competence and European Union Foreign Policy Activity', in E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2002) at p. 51, who suggested that the Court could also rule on the 'irrelevance or inefficacy of such an act in the Community order'.
113. See also Curtin and Wessel, supra n. 66. In that respect it is also interesting to note that the post Lisbon Art. 40 TEU takes a more balanced stance by not only protecting the acquis communautaire, but also the CFSP acquis.
114. See M.-G. Garbagnati Ketvel, 'The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy', ICLQ (2006) p. 77-120 at p. 90: 'it remains doubtful whether the combined effect of Article 46(e) and 47 may result in the conferral upon the ECJ, in respect of provisions of Title V of the EU Treaty, of the same powers of judicial review which it enjoys under the Community Treaty'.
115. Cases T-47/03 Sison [2003] ECR I-2047.
116. and T-327-03 Al-Aqsa. See earlier also Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du people d'Iran v Council [2006] ECR II- 4665.
117. Cases T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat Inter national Foundation v . Council and Com mission, [2005] ECR II-3353.
118. and T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, 21 Sept. 2005 ECR II-3649; (para. 156 Yusuf case).
119. Ibid., para. 161 Yusuf case.
120. Cf. also P. Eeckhout, 'Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights, and UN Security Council Resolutions. In Search of the Right Fit', EUConst (2007) p. 183.
121. Nevertheless, in the appeals judgment in Kadi, the Court made clear that the objectives of the Union cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Community powers. Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 3 Sept. 2008, para. 203.
122. See for a recent analysis also S. Griller, 'International Law, Human Rights and the European Community's Autonomous legal Order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi', EUConst (2008) p. 528-553.
123. and the special forum 'Perspectives on the Kadi case', 2 International Organizations Law Review (2008).
124. Case T-14/98, Hautala v. Council [1999] ECR II-2489, paras. 41-42.
125. See also earlier with respect to third pillars documents Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet [1998] ECR II-2289.
126. Art. 46 EU excludes Title V from the Court's jurisdiction; as confirmed by, e.g., Case T-201/99 Royal Olympic Cruises Ltd and others v. Council and Commission [2000] ECR II-4005.
127. Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran, judgment of 12 Dec. 2006 (para. 49).
128. C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v. Council, judgment of 27 Feb. 2007 (para. 50).
129. Case 314/85 [1987] ECR 4199.
130. Van Ooik, supra n. 70, p. 405-406.
131. Earlier in the same vein: Curtin and Dekker (1999), supra n. 4 at p. 123.
132. Segi case, supra n. 59.
133. Ibid., paras. 54-55.
134. Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285, paras. 19, 21 and 28 (similarity between the sys tem established by Art. 234 EC and that of Art. 35 EU); paras. 33-34 (similarity in the wording of Art. 249 and Art. 34(2)(b)).
135. Ibid., para. 42. Emphasis added.
136. Ibid., para. 36.
137. Further on the Pupino ruling: E. Spaventa, 'Opening Pandora's Box: Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of the Decision in Pupino', EuConst. (2007) p. 5-24.
138. See B. Kurcz and A. azowski, 'Two Sides of the Same Coin? Framework Decisions and Directives Compared', in P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), supra n. 68, p. 177-203 at 179.
139. Cf. R. Barents, who compared the impact of the reasoning in Pupino to the one in Van Gend & Loos. Annotation Case C-105, Pupino, SEW (2006) p. 74.
140. Herrmann, supra n. 3 at p. 18.
141. See also J. Bast, 'The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive Constitution', German Law Journal (2005) p. 1433-1452.
142. Gosalbo Bono, supra n. 8 at p. 393.
143. Cf. Duke and Vanhoonacker, supra n. 13 at p. 180: 'Although civil servants in the national capitals still are very important, the centre of gravity is clearly moving to Brussels'.
144. Bast, supra n. 98 at p. 1438.