The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive Constitution

German Law Journal

Volumn 6, Issue 11, 2005, Pages 1433-1452

  Bast, Jürgen ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 71949089387     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200014425     Document Type: Article

References (103)

1. 1 Jürgen Schwarze, Ein pragmatischer Verfassungsentwurf: Analyse und Bewertung des Entwurfs eines Vertrags über eine Verfassung für Europa, EUROPARECHT 535, 569 (2003);
2. Koen Lenaerts & Damien Gerard, The Structure of the Union According to the Constitution for Europe: the Emperor is Getting Dressed, 29 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 289 (2004).
3. 2 Juliane Kokott & Alexandra Rüth, The European Convention and its Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Appropriate Answers to the Laeken Questions?, 40 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1315, 1320 (2003);
4. Dieter Grimm, Integration durch Verfassung: Absichten und Aussichten im europäischen Konstitutionalisierungsprozess, 32 LEVIATHAN 448, 462 (2004).
5. 3 Nico Krisch, Die Vielheit der europäischen Verfassung, Contribution at the “45. Assistententagung Öffentliches Recht”, Bielefeld, 9–12 March 2005.
6. 4 Christoph Möllers, Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution – Constitutionalisation, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2005, forthcoming), connecting to the typology of KARL LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 203 (1957).
7. 5 Joseph H.H. Weiler, In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE, 7 (Joseph H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003);
8. Joseph H.H. Weiler, A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices, 40 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 563 (2002); Ulrich Haltern, On Finality, in PRINCIPLES, supra note 4.
9. 6 Paul Kirchhof, The Legal Structure of the European Union as a Union of States, in PRINCIPLES, supra note 4.
10. 7 On coherence in the context of European integration, see Stefano Bertea, Looking for Coherence within the European Community, 11 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 154, 170 (2005).
11. 8 On this issue see, e.g., Stefan Oeter, Federalism and Democracy, in PRINCIPLES, supra note 4.
12. 9 The relationship is more complex than generally assumed. Normatively, little speaks for the assumption that diversity is best protected by incoherence. For an opposing tendency, see Krisch, PRINCIPLES note 3.
13. 10 Armin von Bogdandy, Konstitutionalisierung des europäischen öffentlichen Rechts in der europäischen Republik, 60 JURISTENZEITUNG 529, 530 (2005);
14. Armin von Bogdandy, Europäische Verfassung und europäische Identität, 59 JURISTENZEITUNG 53, 56 (2004).
15. 11 Anneli Albi & Peter Van Elsuwege, The EU Constitution, National Constitutions and Sovereignty: An Assessment of a “European Constitutional Order”, 29 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 741, 750 (2004);
16. Clemens Ladenburger, Die Erarbeitung eines Verfassungsentwurfs durch den Konvent, in DER VERFASSUNGSENTWURF DES EUROPÄISCHEN KONVENTS 397 (Jürgen Schwarze ed., 2004);
17. Andreas Maurer, Die Methode des Konvents – ein Modell deliberativer Demokratie?, INTEGRATION 440 (2003).
18. 12 For one side of the controversy, see Armin von Bogdandy, The Legal Case for Unity, 36 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 887 (1999);
19. Manfred Zuleeg, Die Organisationsstruktur der Europäischen Union, EUROPARECHT (BEIHEFT 2) 151 (1998);
20. Bruno de Witte, The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER AMSTERDAM 51 (Ton Heukels et al. eds., 1998).
21. For the other side, see MATTHIAS PECHSTEIN & CHRISTIAN KOENIG, DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION, paras. 56 et seq. (3rd edition 2000).
22. For an intermediate position, see, e.g., Werner Schroeder, European Union and European Communities, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE NEW GERMAN SCHOLARSHIP, Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 9/03 (Joseph H.H. Weiler & Armin von Bogdandy eds., 2003).
23. 13 ECJ, Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, paras. 3/4; Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. I-2763, para. 16.
24. 14 Ingolf Pernice, in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR, para. 20 on Art. 23 of the German Basic Law (HORST DREIER ED., 1998).
25. 15On the compatibility of enhanced cooperation with the constitutional premises of legal unity, see DANIEL THYM, UNGLEICHZEITIGKEIT UND EUROPÄISCHES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 374 (2003).
26. 16 Henri de Waele, The European Union on the Road to a New Legal Order – the Changing Legality of Member State Withdrawal, 12 TILBURG FOREIGN LAW REVIEW 169, 178 (2005).
27. 17 Thomas Bruha & Carsten Nowak, Recht auf Austritt aus der Europäischen Union?, 42 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 1, 21 (2004); Schwarze supra note 1, at 558.
28. 18Declaración del Pleno del Tribunal Constitucional, DTC 1/2004, 13 December 2004, available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm; English translation in: 1 COMMON MARKET LAW REPORTS 39 (2005); see, in particular, paras. 47 and 58.
29. 19 Dieter Grimm, Verfassung II., in GESCHICHTLICHE GRUNDBEGRIFFE VOL. 6, 863, 866 (Otto Brunner et al. eds., 1990); Hermann Heller, Staatslehre, in GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN VOL. 3, 385 (1971).
30. 20 ULRICH K. PREUß, REVOLUTION, FORTSCHRITT UND VERFASSUNG 21 (1994); Möllers, supra note 4; Grimm, supra note 19, at 880.
31. 21 Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft, 9 RECHTSHISTORISCHES JOURNAL 176, 184 (1990).
32. 22 Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, 30 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 17, 22 (1999); SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 111 (2002).
33. 23 See Heinz Mohnhaupt, Verfassung I., in GESCHICHTLICHE GRUNDBEGRIFFE VOL. 6, 832, 840 (Otto Brunner et al. eds., 1990).
34. 24 Theo Öhlinger, Europa auf dem Weg zu einer Verfassung, in EUROPARECHT IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG 379, 385 (Heribert F. Köck et al. eds., 2004);
35. Bardo Fassbender, Die Völkerrechtssubjektivität der Europäischen Union nach dem Entwurf des Verfassungsvertrages, 42 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 26 (2004).
36. 25 Gráinne de Búrca, The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union: Europe’s Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61 WASHINGTON & LEE LAW REVIEW 555, 568 (2004).
37. 26 Patrick Birkinshaw, Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the State, 11 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 31, 42 (2005).
38. 27 Albi & Van Elsuwege, supra note 11, at 751; sceptical, however, Editorial Comments: The CFSP under the EU Constitutional Treaty – Issues of Depillarization, 42 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 325 (2005).
39. 28 On the horizontal delimiting function of this concept, see Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, Österreichischer Rundfunk et al., 2003 ECR I-4989.
40. 29Christiane Trüe, EU-Kompetenzen für Energierecht, Gesundheitsschutz und Umweltschutz nach dem Verfassungsentwurf, 59 JURISTENZEITUNG 779, 783 (2004).
41. 31 For examples, see Jan Wouters, The European Constitution, Parts I and III: Some Critical Reflections, 12 MAASTRICHT JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (2005).
42. 32 Franz C. Mayer, Verfassungsstruktur und Verfassungskohärenz: Merkmale europäischen Verfassungsrechts?, INTEGRATION 398, 399 (2003).
43. 33 See Commission Communication: A Basic Treaty for the European Union, COM(2000) 434 final.
44. 34 See Jörg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty: What Added Value for the ‚Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’?, 1 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 226 (2005).
45. 35 An overview in Daniel Thym, Die neue institutionelle Architektur europäischer Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 42 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 44 (2004).
46. 36 On the delimitation problems, see Tim Corthaut, An Effective Remedy for All? Paradoxes and Controversies in Respect of Judicial Protection in the Field of the CFSP under the European Constitution, 12 TILBURG FOREIGN LAW REVIEW 110 (2005).
47. 37As to the latter, see Christiane Trüe, Das System der EU-Kompetenzen vor und nach dem Entwurf eines europäischen Verfassungsvertrags, 62 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 391, 409 (2004);
48. Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast & Dietrich Westphal, Die vertikale Kompetenzordnung im Entwurf des Verfassungsvertrags, INTEGRATION 414, 422 (2003).
49. 38 On the notion of dual democratic legitimacy, see Armin von Bogdandy, Europäische Prinzipienlehre, in EUROPÄISCHES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 149, 175 (Armin von Bogdandy ed., 2003).
50. 39 For details, see Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast, La loi européenne: Promise and Pretence, in THE EU CONSTITUTION: THE BEST WAY FORWARD? 171 (Deirdre Curtin et al. eds., 2005).
51. 40 On the peculiarities of the “ESCB legal order”, see Jean-Victor Louis, The Economic and Monetary Union: Law and Institutions, 41 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 575, 586 (2004).
52. 41 On this issue, see Fabian Amtenbrink, On the Legitimacy and Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 147 (Anthony Arnull & Daniel Wincott eds., 2002).
53. 42 Regarding the questionable classification as an exclusive competence, see Jörg Ph. Terhechte, Die Rolle des Wettbewerbsrechts in der europäischen Verfassung, EUROPARECHT (BEIHEFT 3) 107, 111 (2004).
54. 43 Michael Dougan, The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: Bringing Europe Closer to its Lawyers?, 28 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 763, 784 (2003);
55. Franklin Dehousse & Wouter Coussens, The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: Old Wine in a New Bottle? 56 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 5, 59, No. 1–2 (2003);
56. similarly, Koen Lenaerts, A Unified Set of Instruments, 1 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 57, 61 (2005);
57. 44 Exemplary, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Increased Differentiation or Stronger Uniformity, in REFORMING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 27 (Jan A. Winter et al. eds., 1996);
58. FILIP TUYTSCHAEVER, DIFFERENTIATION IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW (1999); see also the contributions in THE MANY FACES OF DIFFERENTIATION IN EU LAW (Bruno de Witte et al. eds., 2001).
59. 45 Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY? 1 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2000);
60. Jo Shaw, European Union Legal Studies in Crisis?, 16 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 231, 246 (1996);
61. 46 For elements of a theory of differentiation (“variability”) in European constitutional law, see AMARYLLIS VERHOEVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SEARCH OF A DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 193 (2002).
62. 47 See, e.g., Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Geschichtliche Entwicklung und Bedeutungswandel der Verfassung, in STAAT, VERFASSUNG, DEMOKRATIE 29, 45 (1991);
63. on backgrounds in the history of ideas, see JÜRGEN BAST, TOTALITÄRER PLURALISMUS 52 (1999).
64. 48 Ilse Staff, Der soziale Rechtsstaat: Zur Aktualität der Staatstheorie Hermann Hellers, in DER SOZIALE RECHTSSTAAT 25 (Christoph Müller & Ilse Staff eds., 1984);
65. for the Weimar Constitution, Franz L. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, in THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE 101, 122 (William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996);
66. for the German Basic Law, Wolfgang Abendroth, Zum Begriff des demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaates im Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in AUS GESCHICHTE UND POLITIK 279, 297 (Alfred Herrmann ed., 1954).
67. 49 CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 31 (1928); CARL SCHMITT, DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG 44, 48 (1931).
68. 50 On this relationship, see INGEBORG MAUS, BÜRGERLICHE RECHTSTHEORIE UND FASCHISMUS: ZUR SOZIALEN FUNKTION UND AKTUELLEN WIRKUNG DER THEORIE CARL SCHMITTS 27 (1980).
69. 51 See GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 533 (4th edition 1922).
70. 52 Niels Petersen, Europäische Verfassung und europäische Legitimität, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 429, 450 (2004);
71. 53 Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, 7 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 125, 141 and 146 (2001).
72. 54 See Armin von Bogdandy & Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Guest Editorial: Consolidation of the European Treaties: Feasibility, Costs, and Benefits, 33 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1107, 1109 (1996);
73. on the state of consolidation by the Treaty of Amsterdam, see Christoph Schmid, Konsolidierung und Vereinfachung des europäischen Primärrechts, EUROPARECHT (BEIHEFT 2) 17 (1998).
74. 55 For a German constitutional law perspective, see Hans-Jürgen Papier, Die Neuordnung der europäischen Union, EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHT-ZEITSCHRIFT 753, 754 (2004).
75. 56 See Renaud Dehousse, Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are there Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue?, 18 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 118, No. 3 (1995);
76. on the Parliament’s position in the constitutional setting, Philipp Dann, European Parliament and Executive Federalism, 9 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 549 (2003).
77. 57 Analysis in Paul Craig, Democracy and Rule-making within the EC, 3 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 105, 107 (1997).
78. 58Reflection Group’s Report, SN 520/95, 5 December 1995, paras. 79 and 96, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/cu/agreements/reflex1_en.htm; similarly, European Parliament, Resolution on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, OJ 1995 C 151/56, para. 18.
79. 59 Summarizing, Jean-Paul Jacqué, The Principle of Institutional Balance, 41 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 383, 387 (2004).
80. 60 Case 25/70, Köster, 1970 E.C.R. 116; Case 98/80, Romano, 1981 E.C.R. 1241.
81. 61Koen Lenaerts & Amaryllis Verhoeven, Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 35, 42 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002);
82. Miguel Poiares Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What if This is as Good as it Gets?, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 5, at 74, 90.
83. 63 European Governance: A White Paper, at 9 and 34, COM(2001) 428 final. See MOUNTAIN OR MOLEHILL? A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE COMMISSION WHITE PAPER ON GOVERNANCE, Jean Monnet Working Papers, No. 6/01 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2001).
84. 64 Communication from the Commission: A Project for the European Union, at 24, COM(2002) 247 final.
85. 66 Christian Joerges, Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of the Integration Project, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE 167, 189 (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003);
86. Bo Stråth, Methodological and Substantive Remarks on Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of a European Community, 6 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 255, 268 (2005).
87. 67 JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, The Transformation of Europe, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 10 (1999).
88. 68 For a discourse-theoretical and sociological analysis of the phenomenon of normalism, JÜRGEN LINK, VERSUCH ÜBER DEN NORMALISMUS: WIE NORMALITÄT PRODUZIERT WIRD (1999).
89. 69 See also the instructive “Explanatory note on the ‘Community method’” by the Commission of 22 May 2002 (MEMO/02/102), available at: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/searchAction.do.
90. 70 Adrienne Héritier, The White Paper on European Governance: A Response to Shifting Weights in Interinstitutional Decision-Making, in MOUNTAIN OR MOLEHILL?, supra note 63.
91. 71 CHRISTIAN VON BUTTLAR, DAS INITIATIVRECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN KOMMISSION 274 (2003).
92. 72 On the Parliament’s new powers, see Alan Dashwood & Angus Johnston, The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the Constitutional Treaty, 41 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1481, 1484 (2004);
93. Peter M. Huber, Das institutionelle Gleichgewicht zwischen Rat und Europäischem Parlament in der künftigen Verfassung für Europa, EUROPARECHT 574, 597 (2003).
94. 73 Giacinto della Cananea, Procedures in the New (Draft) Constitution of the European Union, 16 REVUE EUROPEENNE DE DROIT PUBLIC 221, 228 (2001).
95. 75 E.g., Case C-405/01, Colegio de Oficiales de la Marina Mercante Española, 2003 ECR I-10391.
96. 76 I am grateful to Philipp Dann for this thought; see his contribution to this volume.
97. 77 However, it is doubtful whether these considerations justify all deviations from the standard case, see Arts. III-186(2), III-187(4), III-190(3) CT.
98. 78 Günter Frankenberg, The Return of the Contract: Problems and Pitfalls of European Constitutionalism, 6 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 257, 270 (2000); Luhmann, supra note 21 at 190.
99. 79 FRANZ L. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: STRUKTUR UND PRAXIS DES NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 31 (1984); Otto Kirchheimer, Weimar und was dann? Analyse einer Verfassung, in POLITIK UND VERFASSUNG 9, 54 (1964).
100. 80 HASSO HOFMANN, DAS RECHT DES RECHTS, DAS RECHT DER HERRSCHAFT UND DIE EINHEIT DER VERFASSUNG 55 (1998).
101. 81 Otto Kirchheimer, Verfassungsreform und Sozialdemokratie, in FUNKTIONEN DES STAATS UND DER VERFASSUNG 79, 85 (1972).
102. 85 Augustín José Menéndez, Between Laeken and the Deep Blue Sea: An Assessment of the Draft Constitutional Treaty from a Deliberative-Democratic Standpoint, 11 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 105, 142 (2005).
103. 86ECJ, Case C-105/03, Maria Pupino, (16 June 2005, http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0105:EN:HTML).