International law, human rights and the community's autonomous legal order: Notes on the European court of justice decision in Kadi

European Constitutional Law Review

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 528-553

  Griller, Stefan ^a  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649303396     PISSN: 15740196     EISSN: 17445515     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1574019608005282     Document Type: Article

References (125)

1. See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 at para. 131.
2. The argument had been convincingly developed by H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (New York, Frederic Praeger 1950) p. 145 et seq.
3. See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) p. 532.
4. See A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005) p. 377 et seq.
5. See for a survey . However, not all UN members are parties to all of these agreements, which is an impediment to universal application.
6. See especially the body of work of Petersmann, e.g., E.-U. Petersmann, 'From "Negative" to "Positive" Integration in the WTO: Time for "Mainstreaming Human Rights" into WTO Law?', 37 CML Rev. (2000), p. 1363
7. E.-U. Petersmann, 'Time for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organisations. Lessons from European Integration Law for Global Integration Law', Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/01 (2007a)
8. E.-U. Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations "Global Compact" for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration',
9. European Journal of International Law (2002) p. 621
10. E.-U. Petersmann, 'Constitutionalism and the Regulation of International Markets: How to Define the "Development Objectives" of the World Trading System?', EUI Working Paper Law No 2007/23 (2007b) especially at p. 7 et seq.
11. Art. 31 para. 3 lit. c Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Petersmann 2007a, supra n. 5, at p. 13 et seq
12. Petersmann 2002, supra n. 5, at p. 633 et seq.
13. However, this is not undisputed. Compare only the following: R. Howse, 'Human Rights and the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann', 13 European Journal of International. Law (2002), p. 651
14. P. Alston, 'Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann', 13 European Journal of International Law (2002), p. 815
15. E.-U. Petersmann, 'Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston', 13 European Journal of International Law (2002), p. 845.
16. Compare, e.g., Brownlie, supra n. 2, p. 534 et seq.
17. H.J. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000), p. 367, submit that parts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have 'clearly' become customary international law.
18. Cassese (supra n. 3, at p. 395) talks about a right to democratic governance which might be in the process of coming into being. Obviously this would not mean that it forms part of jus cogens.
19. International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment at paras. 33 and 34.
20. A rather cautious approach is taken by Brownlie (supra n. 2, at p. 546 et seq.).
21. E.g., Petersmann 2007a, supra n. 5, at p. 14.
22. CIT/1998/PR20A .
23. Compare already Lauterpacht, supra n. 1, at p. 159 et seq.
24. See also Petersmann 2007a and 2002, supra n. 5.
25. For an in depth debate see E. de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing 2004), esp. p. 178 et seq., and p. 217 et seq. Her conclusion that the Security Council is mainly bound by jus cogens and the principles of the Charter (like self-defence and the right to self-determination) is rather cautious regarding human rights standards. It appears to correspond to a certain extent to the findings of the CFI to be discussed below.
26. See .
27. Common Position 2001/154/CFSP concerning additional restrictive measures against the Taliban and amending Common Position 96/746/CFSP, OJ [2001] L 57/1, 27.2.2001; Regulation (EC) No. 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation No. 337/ 2000, OJ [2001] L 67/1, 9.3.2001 (adopted on the basis of Arts. 60 and 301 TEC); as amended, inter alia, by Regulation (EC) No. 2199/ 2001, OJ [2001] L 295/16, 13.11.2001.
28. See especially Common Position 2002/402/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaeda organisation and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing Common Positions 96/746, 1999/727, 2001/154 and 2001/771/CFSP, OJ [2002] L 139/4, 29.5.2002; as amended by Common Position 2003/140/CFSP, OJ 2003 L 53, p. 62. Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001, OJ [2002] L 139/9, 29.5.2002; as amended, e.g., by Regulation (EC) No. 561/2003, OJ [2003] L 82/1, 29.3.2003; and Regulation (EC) No. 866/2003, OJ [2003] L 124/19, 20.5.2003.
29. CFI 21 Sept. 2005, Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission (hereinafter, Yusuf case).
30. Almost identical is CFI 21 Sept. 2005, Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission. The quotations in the above text are taken from the Yusuf case. However, the wording in Case T-315/01 (Kadi) is almost identical.
31. Compare also the subsequent judgments of the CFI: Especially CFI 12 July 2006, Case T-49/04, Hassan v. Council and Commission
32. CFI 12 July 2006, Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council
33. CFI 31 Jan. 2007, Case T-362/04, Minin v. Commission.
34. ECJ 3 Sept. 2008, Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation (hereinafter, Kadi and Al Barakaat International case).
35. Suffice it to state that both claims were dismissed, even if partly on very much differing grounds - compare in this respect Kadi and Al Barakaat International, supra n. 20, paras. 121-247.
36. Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, supra n. 19, at para. 231.
37. Ibid., at para. 233 et seq.
38. Ibid., at para. 240.
39. Ibid., at paras. 242 et seq.
40. Ibid., at paras. 263 et seq.
41. Ibid., at para. 277.
42. Ibid., at para. 281.
43. CFI 12 Dec. 2006, Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council (hereinafter, Modjahedines case), at paras. 100 et seq.
44. Kadi and Al Barakaat International, supra n. 20, para. 327.
45. Ibid., para. 326.
46. Ibid., para. 285.
47. Ibid., para. 288.
48. Ibid., paras. 281-284; compare also paras. 316 et seq.
49. Ibid., paras. 291-297, esp. at para. 296.
50. Ibid., para. 298.
51. Ibid., paras. 318-326.
52. Ibid., paras. 334-353.
53. Ibid., paras. 354-370.
54. In this respect in general, compare only P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004), esp. p. 274 et seq., with further references.
55. For a - positive - appraisal of the CFI judgments in the cases Yusuf and Kadi see the comments by C. Tomuschat, 'Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission; Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission', CML Rev. (2006), p. 537.
56. Critique can be found in P. Eeckhout, 'Community Terrorism Listings Fundamental rights, and UN Security Council Resolutions', 3 European Constitutional Law Review (2007), p. 183.
57. Compare for the theoretical dimension of the issue in the text infra after n. 90.
58. Compare supra n. 25.
59. The CFI convincingly referred, by analogy, to ECJ, 12 Dec. 1972, Case 21-24/72, International Fruit, paras. 10-18, where the ECJ held that the Community was bound by obligations flowing from the GATT which all members had been parties to before founding the Community.
60. Kadi and Al Barakaat International, supra n. 20, esp. para. 296, but also paras. 285, 288, 300-309.
61. This was prepared esp. by AG Poiares Maduro, 16 Jan. 2008, Case C-402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi (hereinafter, Kadi case), para. 21 et seq.
62. and esp. para. 39 of the Opinion; in the same vein AG Poiares Maduro, 23 Jan. 2008, Case C-415/05 P, Al Barakaat International Foundation (hereinafter, Al Barakaat case).
63. Kadi and Al Barakaat International, supra n. 20, paras. 282, 316 et seq.
64. Compare supra n. 33.
65. This is rightly stressed by AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi case, supra n. 45, para. 30 of the Opinion.
66. A different view can be found in Eeckhout, 2007, supra n. 41 at p. 191 et seq.
67. Kadi and Al Barakaat International, supra n. 20, para. 298.
68. ECJ 16 June 1998, C-162/96, Racke, para. 45. Reconfirmed in Kadi and Al Barakaat International, supra n. 20, para. 291.
69. Kadi and Al Barakaat International, supra n. 20, para. 285.
70. Ibid., paras. 301-304. Less surprising is that 'primacy' of international agreements including UN law according to Art. 300(7) ECT could never extend to primary law, of which fundamental rights form part; compare paras. 305-309.
71. Furthermore, the content of jus cogens remains unclear. In Yusuf case (supra n. 19) the CFI considered aspects of the right to property, the right to a fair hearing, and the right to judicial remedy.
72. In Hassan v. Council and Commission (supra n. 19, at para. 127) it referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in order to contemplate on a possible right to respect for private and family life and a right to a reputation: 'Even if the right to respect for private and family life and the right to a reputation may be regarded as falling within the ambit of the rules of jus cogens relating to the protection of the fundamental rights of the human person, only arbitrary interference with the exercise of those rights could be considered to be contrary to those rules (on this point, see Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation").'
73. Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, supra n. 19, at para. 270
74. see also at para. 280.
75. Ibid., at para. 339.
76. The issue is rightly raised by AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi case, supra n. 45, paras. 33 et seq. of the Opinion.
77. ECtHR 30 June 2005, Application No. 45036/98, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland: State action taken in compliance with 'obligations flowing from its membership of an international organisation to which it has transferred part of its sovereignty' (para. 154) is justified 'as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides.' (para. 155) 'If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation.' (para. 156)
78. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland (supra n. 57, at para. 156): 'However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international co-operation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a "constitutional instrument of European public order" in the field of human rights.' Such consequence could only be avoided if the ECtHR would follow the CFI's reading of Art. 103 UN Charter which would then imply to disregard from the guarantees of the ECHR. This can hardly be expected. And it would not appear to be well founded legally either.
79. Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, supra n. 19, at para. 344.
80. Ibid., at para. 338.
81. Ibid., at para. 342
82. see also para. 374.
83. Tomuschat, supra n. 41, at p. 551.
84. ECJ 17 Dec. 1970, Case C-11/70 Internationale HandelsgesellschaftmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, at para. 3
85. (see also ECJ 13 Dec. 1979, Case C-44/79 Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, at para. 14): 'Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. [...] [T]he law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.' Therefore, it cannot be expected either that the ECJ would accept reading Art. 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union differently.
86. In this vein Eeckhout, supra n. 41.
87. See especially Solange I (BVerfG 29 May 1974, Case BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271, esp. at 285)
88. Solange II (BVerfG 22 Oct. 1984, Case 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339, esp. at 383 et seq.) Banana judgment (BVerfG 7 June 2000, Case 2 BvL 1/ 97, BVerfGE 102, 147). This jurisprudence is not overturned by BVerfG 18 July 2005, Case 2 BvR 2236/04, BVerfGE 113, 273, esp. paras. 74 et seq. and 81 et seq. . The Constitutional Court annulled the German law for violating constitutional guarantees, the preservation of which could have been brought in line with the European framework decision at issue.
89. BVerfG 12 Oct. 1993, Case 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155.
90. The English version of the first part of the citation is taken from 'Brunner v The European Union Treaty', 1 Common Market Law Reports (1994), p. 57 at p. 79.
91. Banana Judgment, supra n. 65; the author's own translation of the second part.
92. For an evaluation compare M. Cartabia, 'The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship Between the Italian legal system and the European Union', in A.-M. Slaughter et al. (eds.), The European Court and National Courts (Oxford, Hart Publishing 1998) p. 133.
93. See supra n. 57 and n. 58.
94. See Bosphorus Hava Yollary Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, supra n. 57, at para. 155.
95. Ibid.
96. Art. 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
97. See supra in the text near n. 14.
98. Art. 6 para. 2 TEU.
99. E.g., ECtHR 7 Dec. 1976, Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 5493/72, at para. 49, with regard to Art. 10 para. 2 of the Convention: It held there is no unlimited power of appreciation for the Contracting States, but it is instead the Court which gives the final ruling. 'The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision.'
100. Lauterpacht (supra n. 1, at p. 145 et seq.) forcefully elaborates on the significance of the Charter with regard to human rights protection.
101. Compare for the following: S. Griller, Die Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten auf zwischenstaatliche Einrichtungen (Wien, Springer 1989), at p. 449 et seq.
102. Outside the scope of jus cogens, the CFI appears to advocate the impossibility of challenging illegal measures adopted by international organs and the Security Council specifically. Such measures would consequently remain exempt from any judicial review. This is different regarding jus cogens. Here, the Court obviously shares the view presented above; otherwise it could not feel entitled to scrutinise Security Council resolutions with the possible consequence of declaring them illegal and prohibiting their enforcement. Unfortunately, the CFI does not explain this difference.
103. E.g., in the case of sanctions against Liberia: Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1521 (2003) of 22 Dec. 2003 and 1532 (2004) of 12 March 2004. This played a certain role in dealing with a complaint against being listed by the Sanctions Committee: See Minin v. Commission, supra n. 19, esp. paras. 100 et seq.
104. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1730 (2006) of 19 Dec. 2006.
105. Compare, e.g., the Guidelines of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia.
106. Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities.
107. See supra in the text after n. 38. Compare also Hassan v. Council and Commission, supra n. 19, at para. 119, where the CFI arrived at the same result as soon as it applied 'normal' and not only jus cogens standards.
108. While the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN (Art. 92 UN Charter), it is not entrusted with reviewing the lawfulness of measures of UN organs. Such review is only available indirectly through an advisory opinion of the ICJ (Art. 96 UN Charter). However, such procedure can only be opened upon request of the General Assembly or the Security Council, a majority in one of those bodies being needed. It has never happened that a UN member which felt unjustly treated succeeded in opening such review procedure.
109. Such review mechanism would itself have to meet the human rights standards valid within the United Nations. However, an initiative to that end is not in sight.
110. Kadi and Al Barakaat International, supra n. 20, para. 318 et seq.
111. Ibid., para. 326.
112. Compare also the passage in AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi case, supra n. 45, para. 54 of the Opinion.
113. On monism, dualism, and the relationship between EC law on the one hand and both national and international law on the other hand compare S. Griller, 'Völkerrecht und Landesrecht - unter Berücksichtigung des Europarechts', in R. Walter/C. Jabloner/K. Zeleny (Hrsg), Hans Kelsen und das Völkerrecht. Ergebnisse eines internationalen Symposiums in Wien (1.-2. April 2004), Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsen-Instituts, Band 26 (Wien, Verlag Manz, 2004) p. 83-120, with further references.
114. The piece includes a critique of the crucial thesis of the autonomy of the Community legal order (at p. 105 et seq). The above text builds on these grounds without deepening the issue. From the recent academic debate compare only H. Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts (Berlin et al., Springer 2003), favouring 'pragmatic' solutions
115. and M. Jestaedt, 'Der Europäische Verfassungsverbund. Verfassungstheoretischer Charme und rechtstheoretische Insuffizienz einer Unschärferelation', in Ch. Callies (Hrsg.), Verfassungswandel im europäischen Staaten- und Verfassungsverbund (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck publishers 2007) p. 93, favouring a 'classical' monist solution.
116. E.g., J. Baquero Cruz, 'The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement',
117. European Law Journal (2008), p. 389
118. M. Kumm, 'The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty', 11 European Law Journal (2005), p. 262
119. M. Poiares Maduro, 'Contrapunctal Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action', in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford - Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing 2003), p. 501
120. N. Walker, 'The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism', 65 Modern Law Review (2002), p. 317.
121. Compare supra n. 46.
122. See already ECJ 5 Feb. 1963,Case C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, at p. 12.
123. AG Poiares Maduro, in his opinion in Kadi case (supra n. 19, at para. 21) puts it that way: 'in other words, the treaty has created at municipal legal order of trans-national dimension is, of which it forms the "basic constitutional charter".'
124. AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi case, supra n. 45, at para. 21 of the Opinion.
125. There is, however, an important difference regarding 'pragmatic' solutions. It is submitted that such 'pragmatic' solutions tend to favour the subjective preferences of those who propose them, or legitimise solutions which were developed without much theoretical underpinning.