The inside looking out: Consistency and delimitation in EU external relations

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 37, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 1135-1171

  Wessel, Ramses A ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85102810184     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: 18758320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005678103009     Document Type: Article

References (140)

1. 1. See e.g. von Bogdandy and Nettesheim, “Ex Pluribus Unum – Fusion of the European Communities into the European Union”, (1996) EL Rev., 267 et seq.; Tru¨e, Verleihung von Rechtsperso¨nlichkeit and die Europa¨ische Union und Verschmelzung zu einer einzigen Organisation – deklaratorisch oder konstitutiv?, Universita¨t des Saarlandes: Vortra¨ge, Reden und Berichte aus dem Europa-Institut, No. 357 (Saarlandes, 1997); De Witte, “The pillar structure and the nature of the European Union: Greek temple or French gothic cathedral?”, in Heukels, Blokker, Brus (Eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam (1998), pp. 51–68; Curtin and Dekker, “The EU as a ‘layered’ international organization: Institutional unity in disguise”, in Craig and de Bu´rca (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999), pp. 83–136; Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective (Kluwer Law International, 1999); and recently von Bogdandy, “The legal case for unity: The European Union as a single organization with a single legal system”, 36 CML Rev. (1999), 887–910.
2. 2. See e.g. Wessel, op. cit. supra note 1.
3. 3. See e.g. Do¨rr, “Zur Rechtsnatur der Europa¨ischen Union”, (1995) EuR, 334–348; Devroe and Wouters, De Europese Unie. Het Verdrag van Maastricht en zijn uitvoering: analyse en perspectieven (Leuven, 1996); Klabbers, “Presumptive personality: The European Union in international law” in Koskenniemi (Ed.), International law Aspects of the European Union (The Hague, 1998), pp. 231–253; Tru¨e, op. cit. supra note 1; Wessel, “The international legal status of the European Union”, (1997) European Foreign Affairs Review (hereafter: EFA Rev.), 109–130; De Witte, op. cit. supra note 1; and Curtin and Dekker, op. cit. supra note 1. Some authors have even argued that the existence of a Union legal system implies a fusion of the three pillars. See esp. the contributions of von Bogdandy, op. cit.supra note 1.
4. 4. See e.g. Koenig and Pechstein, Die Europa¨ische Union: Der Vertrag von Maastricht (Tu¨bingen, 1995), at p. 22: “Jedenfalls im nichtjuristischen Sprachgebrauch hat sich sehr rasch eine Redeweise verbreitet, die den Begriff der ‘Europa¨ischen Union’ im Sinne einer eigensta¨ndigen Einheit verwendet, welche die bisherigen Gemeinschaften vollsta¨ndig ersetzt hat”.
5. 5. See also Dekker and Wessel, “The European Union and the concept of flexibility: proliferation of legal systems within international organizations” in Blokker and Schermers (Eds.), Proliferation of International Organizations (Kluwer Law International, 2000, forthcoming). Cf. also Do¨rr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 336: “eine eigenrechtliche Einheit”; and De Witte, op. cit. supra note 1, at 59: “a unified international organization”.
6. 6. See infra; and Curtin and Van Ooik, “Een Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie?”, (1999) SEW, 24–38.
7. 7. Malt, “Methods for the solution of conflicts between rules in a system of positive law” in Brouwer, Hol, Soeteman, Van der Velden, De Wild (Eds.), Coherence and Conflict in Law (Kluwer, 1992), pp. 201–226, 203.
8. 8. Bieber and Salome´, “Hierarchy of norms in European law”, 33 CML Rev. (1996), 907–930, 909.
9. 9. Cf. Malt, op. cit.supra note 7, at 202.
10. 10. These “principles of preference” are usually referred to as: the lex posterior principle: lex posterior derogat legi priori (a later provision overrules an earlier one); the lex specialis principle: lex specialis derogat legi generali (a more special provision overrules a general one); the lex superior principle: lex superior derogat legi inferior (a provision with higher rank overrules a provision with lower rank). Sometimes a fourth principle is added to this list: lex posterior generalis non derogat legi priori speciali (if a later general norm is incompatible with an earlier but less general norm, one must apply the earlier and less general norm). See esp. on an analysis of these principles: Malt, op. cit. supra note 7; Peczenik, “Legal collision of norms and moral consideration” in Brouwer et al. (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 7, p. 182.
11. 11. See esp. Malt op. cit.supra note 7 and Peczenik op. cit.supra note 10.
12. 12. See also Cremona, “The European Union as an international actor: The issues of flexibility and linkage”, (1998) EFA Rev., 67–94, 68.
13. 13. Cremona, ibid. at 69.
14. 14. See e.g. the Tampere Conclusions of the European Council, 15–16 Oct. 1999, part D, on a stronger external action in the field of Justice and Home Affairs.
15. 15. It may be recalled that, in the early days in particular, it was generally maintained that the Union lacks legal personality. See e.g. Everling, “Reflections on the structure of the European Union”, 29 CML Rev. (1992), 1053–1077; Curtin, “The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe of bits and pieces”, 30 CML Rev. (1993), 17–69; Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law (Kluwer, 1995), Besselink, “Tussen supranationaliteit en soevereiniteit: over het niet-communautaire recht van de Europese Unie” in Besselink, Hins, Jans, De Reede, Van der Vlies, Europese Unie en nationale soevereiniteit (Deventer, 1997), or Neuwahl, “A partner with a troubled personality: EU treaty-making in matters of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam”, (1998) EFA Rev., 177–197.
16. 16. The European Union Today and Tomorrow, Adapting the European Union for the Benefit of its Peoples and Preparing it for the Future. A General Outline for a Draft Revision of the Treaties, Document CONF 2500/96, Brussels, 5 Dec. 1996, Chapt. 13. More extensively on this topic: Neuwahl, op. cit. supra note 15.
17. 17. Illustrative in this respect is the Report of the Italian Presidency presented to the European Council in June 1996, in which the legal personality of the Union was acknowledged. The Report is reproduced in European Parliament Intergovernmental Task Force, White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Vol. 1, Official Texts of the European Union Institutions, at 64.
18. 18. A similar conclusion is drawn by Blokker and Heukels, “The European Union: Historical origins and institutional challenges” in Heukels et al., op. cit.supra note 1, at 37. See also the statement made by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to the House of Commons on 18 June 1997: “… others wanted to give the EU explicit legal personality across all pillars. At our insistence, this was removed” (emphasis added). This seems to confirm the assertion made by De Witte, op. cit. supra note 1, at 63, that the “lack of consensus is, apparently, due to the ‘word-fetishism’ displayed once more by the British delegation, but [that] the subjective intention to withhold legal personality does not exclude that legal personality may have been implicitly granted … ”. Cf. also Seidl-Hohenveldern and Loibl, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen einschließlich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften (Ko¨ln, 1996), p. 11: “Das Fehlen ausdru¨cklicher Bestimmungen u¨ber die Rechtsperso¨nlichkeit der EU im Vo¨lkerrecht und im innerstaatlichen Recht ist kein Grund, diese der EU zu verweigern. Sie kann solche vielmehr kraft implied powers … genießen. Im u¨brigen entspricht es dem Willen der Mitgliedstaaten, der EU einen ‘einheitlichen institutionellen Rahmen zu geben’ ….”
19. 19. In that respect one may probably see it as the legal counterpart of the concept of supranationalism used in political science.
20. 20. Bekker, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organizations: A Functional Nessecity Analysis of Their Legal Status and Immunities (Dordrecht, 1994), p. 53.
21. 21. In German: Rechtsperso¨nlichkeit. See Bekker, op. cit. supra note 20, at 60, and Schermers and Blokker, op. cit. supra note 15, at 975. Cf. also Hafner, “The Amsterdam Treaty and the treaty-making power of the European Union: Some critical comments” in Hafner et al. (Eds.), Liber Amicorum Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern ? In Honour of his 80th Birthday (Kluwer, 1998) at p. 259: “As such, the organization becomes a fundamental structural element of the international order”.
22. 22. In German: Rechtsfa¨hichkeit. The definition of legal personality as having a standing under international law seems also to have been the basis for the following remarks made by the International Court of Justice in the Reparation for Injuries case: “Has the organization such a nature as involves the capacity to bring an international claim? … In other words, does the Organization possess international personality?” The Court continued: “… what it does mean is that it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties … ”. Reparation case at 179.
23. 23. Detter, Law-Making by International Organizations (Stockholm, 1965), p. 21; and O’Connell, International Law, Vol. 1 (London, 1970), p. 109.
24. 24. Cf. Rama-Montaldo, “International legal personality and implied powers of international organizations”, (1997) BYIL, 111–155, 124 and 134; Oppenheim, International Law (London, 1967), p. 216. This must have been the reason for De Witte, op. cit.supra note 1, at 62, also to assert that “[l]egal personality should be held to refer only to the capacity of the European Union to act as a subject of international law, that is, to conclude treaties and conduct diplomatic relations with third states and other international organizations”. It seems important to recall that international organizations as independent legal persons are not by definition bound to the same international legal obligations as their Member States. Apart from ius cogens, international organizations too can only be bound on the basis of their own free will.
25. 25. Bekker, op. cit. supra note 20, at 63–64; Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 1990), at pp. 683–689. While the “will approach” in particular would stress that the existence of any of these capacities would depend on their express or implied inclusion in the constituting treaty, Rama-Montaldo, op. cit. supra note 24, at 139–140, asserted that some general capacities seem to follow from the entity’s recognized standing in international law: 1 the right to express its will through the different legal ways found in the international order for producing legal effects on the international plane; and 2 rights which enable the organization to manifest itself as a distinct entity and make possible relations with other international persons. While at first sight these capacities indeed seem necessary to make any sense of the concept of legal personality, the problem is that the categories are so broad that any distinction between personality and capacity would disappear. Therefore, for a theoretical analysis, the more formal approach seems the most helpful, since it enables one to unravel further elements.
26. 26. Or by another legal entity of which the legal person is an agency. Cf. Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 25, at 65. In a somewhat different manner, Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge, 1999), at p. 137, made a distinction between competence, power, and capacity. In his analysis of federal States and international treaties, Weiler looked at the extent to which the internal division of competences between the central authority and constituent Member States affects the ability of the federal government to secure the implementation of treaty obligations; the extent to which the division of internal competences affects the treaty powers of the federal government; and the extent to which the non-unitary character of the federal State affects the international capacity of the federation or the Member States.
27. 27. Bekker, op. cit. supra note 20, at 71. While Bekker does not refer to capacities as general competences, his analysis seems to amount to the same thing. To clarify the distinction between personality, capacity and competence, Bekker used the International Tin Council as an example: although the ITC, being endowed with personality, may have the general capacity to contract, it is only competent to contract with respect to tin.
28. 28. See esp. Neuwahl, op. cit. supra note 15; Timmermans, “Het Verdrag van Amsterdam. Enkele inleidende kanttekeningen”, (1997) SEW, 344–350, 346; Cremona, “External relations and external competence: The emergence of an integrated policy” in Craig and De Bu´rca (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 137–175, 168; and Van Ooik, De keuze der rechtsgrondslag voor besluiten van de Europese Unie (Kluwer, 1999), at p. 370. Cf. also De Zwaan, “Community Dimensions of the Second Pillar” in Heukels et al., op. cit. supra note 1, at 182, who seems to recognize that this is a legal capacity of the Union, but nevertheless denies the existence of a “formal legal personality”. It has even been argued that Art. 24 agreements are “not legally binding” and not to be viewed as treaties; see the opinion of the Dutch Government in the documents of the Second Chamber, TK 1997–1998, 25 922 (R 1613), no. 5, at 51.
29. 29. See for an evaluation of these arguments Wessel, op. cit. supra note 1, 260–264.
30. 30. Contra Ress, “Ist die Europa¨ische Union eine juristische Person?”, (1995) EuR, 27– 40, 33, who seems to regard the Accession Treaties with the new Member States as treaties concluded by the Union on the basis of Art. O TEU (now Art. 49). However, regardless of the competences of the Institutions in this area, the final agreements are concluded between the Member States of the Union and the new State; the Union as such is not mentioned as a party.
31. 31. Annex IV of Chapter IV of the document on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, Brussels European Council, 29 Oct. 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency. Also published as Document 1412 of the Assembly of the Western European Union, 8 April 1994.
32. 32. Signed in Geneva on 5 July 1994.
33. 33. See Klabbers, op. cit. supra note 3, 250. The text of the Letters can be found in O.J. 1994, C 241/399.
34. 34. Concluded in Washington on 28 Sept. 1995. The Interim Agreement is partly reproduced in 36 ILM 551 (1997). See also Paasivirta, “The European Union: From an aggregate of states to a legal person?”, Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium (1997), 37–59, 55.
35. 35. Also Do¨rr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 339.
36. 36. Cf. Tru¨e, op. cit. supra note 1, at 45: “Art. J.5 Abs. 1 EUV [now Art. 18; RAW] kann daher nur so verstanden werden, daß die EU selbst vertreten wird, und dazu muß die EU ein Rechtssubjekt sein”.
37. 37. See e.g. Council Decisions 93/604/CFSP (Russian Parliamentary elections); 93/678/CFSP (South Africa); 96/406/CFSP (Bosnia and Herzegovina); 96/656/CFSP and 97/875/CFSP (Zaire/Congo).
38. 38. See e.g. Council Decisions 96/250/CFSP (African Great Lakes); 96/676/CFSP (Middle East); and 98/289/CFSP (Palestinian Authority).
39. 39. Council Regulation (EC) No. 3381/94 of 19 Dec. 1994, O.J. 1994, L 367, emphasis added. Cf. Do¨rr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 334.
40. 40. Common Position 2 Dec. 1996. See also Cremona, op. cit. supra note 12, at 93.
41. 41. Ress, op. cit. supra note 30, at 34, and Lecheler, “Der Rechstcharakter der ‘Europa¨ischen Union”’ in Ipsen, Rengeling, Mo¨ssner, Weber (Eds.), Verfassungsrecht im Wandel (Ko¨ln, 1995), pp. 383–393, 389.
42. 42. See Council Act (1999/C 26/04) of 3 Nov. 1998, O.J. 1999, C 26.
43. 43. Emphasis added.
44. 44. Cf. Keukeleire, Het buitenlands beleid van de Europese Unie (Kluwer, 1998), at p. 99.
45. 45. Before the entry into force of the TEU, some matters were discussed in the framework of EPC that afterwards found their way into the Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA). These matters included: the international conventions concerning the transfer of sentenced persons, the prohibition of double jeopardy and the abolition of the legalization of documents between the Member States. See Neuwahl, “Foreign and security policy and the implementation of the requirement of ‘consistency’ under the Treaty of European Union” in O’Keeffe and Twomey (Eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (London, 1994), at p. 233.
46. 46. See Den Boer, “Wearing the inside out: European policy cooperation between internal and external security”, (1997) EFA Rev., 491–508, at 492–494. Cf. the Declaration on Article 73j(2)(b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, adopted by the Amsterdam IGC.
47. 47. See Den Boer, Taming the Third Pillar: Improving the Management of Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation in the EU (Maastricht, 1998), at p. 25. To tackle the problem of overlap, the EU initiated some horizontal working programmes, like the Madrid Working Programme on Drugs, adopted by the Council on 15 and 16 Dec. 1995.
48. 48. See the “Draft Model Agreement with Third States”, (1998) Statewatch, 5, 20–21.
49. 49. Despite the various references to the acquis communautaire, the Treaty nowhere defines this notion. This French term is not even commonly used in the Union; it is only used in the French, English and Dutch versions of the Treaty. The other translations use expressions in their own language (e.g. Spanish: “acervo comunitario”, German: “gemeinschaftlichen Besitzstands”, or Swedish: “gemenskapens regelverk”). However, from both the doctrine and the accession treaties of 1972, 1979, 1985 and 1994 one can derive that the notion covers the whole of existing Community rules and norms, including the case law of the ECJ and CFI. See Devroe and Wouters, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 98; Curti Gialdino, Il Trattato di maastricht sull’Unione Europea (Rome, 1995), at p. 1091: “It means, in substance, that the applicant States must accept ‘without reservation’ the whole of the following: the founding Treaties and their political objectives, all measures enacted after establishment of the Community, as well as the options chosen for the development of the European construct”. A recent and rather extensive analysis of the (unclear) notion of the acquis communautaire was made by Weatherill, “Safeguarding the Acquis Communautaire”, in Heukels et al., op.cit. supra note 1, pp. 153–178. Some authors hold that the notion of the acquis communautaire after Maastricht refers to the acquis of the Union, thus comprising the developments in CFSP and PJCC; see esp. Elliott, “Neutrality, the acquis communautaire and the European Union’s search for a common foreign and security policy under Title V of the Maastricht Treaty: The Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden”, (1996) Ga.J. Int’l & Comp.l, 601–639, at 619–620. While in discussions on the accession of new Member States it may be convenient to use the term in this sense, using this definition in interpreting the TEU would deprive the notion of all possible relevance.
50. 50. Cf. Constantinesco, Kovar and Simon (Eds.), Traite´ sur l’Union Europe´enne: Commentaire article par article (Paris, Economica, 1995), at p. 73.
51. 51. See also Willaert and Marque´s-Ruiz, “Vers une politique e´trange‘re et de se´curite´ commune:e´tats des lieux”, (1995) Revue du Marche´ Unique Europe´en, 35–95, 40.
52. 52. Cf. Devroe and Wouters, op. cit. supra note 3, at 613, who assert that the claim of CFSP to cover “all areas of foreign and security policy” (Art. 11(1) only holds true insofar as these areas do not fall under the provisions in either the Community or PJCC.
53. 53. See Pechstein, “Das Koha¨renzgebot als entscheidende Integrationsdimension der Europa¨ischen Union”, (1995) EuR, 247–258, 252; Devroe and Wouters, op. cit. supra note 3, at 99 point to the fact that despite the preservation of the acquis communautaire, the modified EC Treaty and the annexed Protocols do show examples of “deterioration”: the deletion of Art. 116 (common trade policy), decreasing the influence of the European Parliament in particular programmes (research and development), the Protocol on real estate in Denmark, the Barber Protocol and the Grogan Protocol.
54. 54. Cf. Pechstein, op. cit.supra note, 252.
55. 55. Cf. Van Ooik, op. cit. supra note 28, at 356 who claimed that a general relationship between the three Union areas cannot be assumed.
56. 56. Van Ooik, op. cit.supra note 28.
57. 57. Cf. Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, [1996] ECR I-6177, in which the ECJ decided on the justified use of a Community legal basis as the key elements of the agreement at stake were Community issues irrespective of their relation with CJHA issues.
58. 58. Compare Art. 3 TEU. The terms vertical and horizontal consistency were also used by Krenzler and Schneider, “Die Gemeinsame Außenund Sicherheitspolitik der Europa¨ischen Union – Zur Frage der Koha¨renz”, (1994) EuR, 144–161 and Krenzler and Schneider, “The Question of Consistency” in Regelsberger, De Schoutheete, Wessels (Eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (Boulder, 1997), pp. 133–152. The authors define “consistency” in terms of European policy as “coordinated, coherent behaviour based on agreement among the Union and its Member States, where comparable and compatible methods are used in pursuit of a single objective and result in an uncontradictory (foreign) policy”. The terms vertical and horizontal coherence are used by Tietje, “The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy”, (1997) EFA Rev., 211–234. See also Monar, “The Foreign Affairs System of the Maasticht Treaty: A Combined Assessment of the CFSP and EC External Relations Elements”, in Monar, Ungerer, Wessels (Eds.), The Maastricht Treaty on European Union: Legal Complexity and Political Dynamic (Brussels, 1993); Mu¨ller-Graff, “Europa¨ische Politische Zusammenarbeit und Gemeinsame Auenund Sicherheitspolitik: Koha¨renzgebot aus rechtlicher Sicht”, (1993) Integration, 147–157; Schmalz, Koha¨renz der EU-Aussenbeziehungen? Der Dualismus von gemeinschaft und gemeinsamer Aussenund Sicherheitspolitik in der Praxis, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Arbeitspapier (Sankt Augustin, 1997); and Schmalz, “The Amsterdam Provisions on External Coherence: Bridging the Union’s Foreign Policy Dualism”, (1998) EFA Rev., 421– 442.
59. 59. Neuwahl, op. cit.supra note 45, at 234, referred to a possible distinction between the requirements of “organization consistency” (as in Art. 1) and “material consistency” (as in Arts. 3 and 13).
60. 60. In the German, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and Danish versions respectively.
61. 61. Taken from Tietje, op. cit. supra note, at 212–213. See also Van der Velden, “Coherence in law: A deductive and a semantic explication of coherence”, in Brouwer et al., op. cit. supra note 7, at 279, and Wintgens, “Some critical comments on coherence in law”, in Brouwer et al., op. cit. supra note 7, at 110.
62. 62. The same conclusion is drawn by Krenzler and Schneider, op. cit. supra note 58 (1994), at 157–159. Cf. also Gilsdorf, “Les re´serves de se´curite´ du Traite´ CEE, a’ la lumie‘re du Traite´ sur l’Union Europe´enne”, (1994) RMC, No. 374, 17–25.
63. 63. Cf. Case C-473/93, Commission v. Luxembourg, [on Art. F(1) TEU (now Art. 6)]. See also Peers, “National Security and European Law”, (1997) YEL, 399.
64. 64. Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council, [1998] ECR I-2763.
65. 65. Cases T-349/00 and T-350/99, pending.
66. 66. See also Neuwahl, op. cit. supra note 45, at 246.
67. 67. Cf. in this line also the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-84/95, Bosphorus, [1996] ECR I-3953.
68. 68. See also Pechstein, op. cit. supra note at 258.
69. 69. The development of the EU’s external relations in the PJCC area is still on the Council’s agenda and mainly concerns a number issues decided upon by the European Council of Tampere (Oct. 1999), including a full use of the agreements based on Art. 38 TEU and a Unionwide fight against crime. In addition one may point to international agreements concluded by Europol.
70. 70. Cf. Curtin and Van Ooik, op. cit. supra note 6, at 27.
71. 71. See in general on exports of dual-use goods under EU law: Koutrakos, “Exports of Dual-use Goods Under the Law of the European Union”, (1998) EL Rev., 235–251.
72. 72. Council Decision 94/942/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 3381/94, of 19 Dec. 1994, O.J. 1994, L 367. See also Emiliou, “Strategic export controls, national security and the Common Commercial Policy”, (1996) EFA Rev., 55–78. The legality of using Art. 113 EC (now 133) as a legal basis for this Regulation is disputed. While some value a specific Community legal basis; e.g. Eeckhout, The European Internal Market and International Trade: A Legal Analysis (Oxford, 1994), at p. 258. Others consider a CFSP basis as sufficient; e.g. Van Ooik, “Externe bevoegdheden van de Europese Unie – Colloqium verslag en synthese” in Externe bevoegdeheden van de Europese Unie, (Den Haag: TMC Asser Instituut, 1994), pp. 113–130, 119. The solution presented by Kuijper, to use Art. 310 EC (ex 228a) seems problematic, keeping in mind the reference to the “necessary urgent measures” in that Article. See Kuijper, “Trade sanctions, security and human rights and commercial policy” in Maresceau (Ed.), The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension (Dordrecht, 1993), pp. 387–422, 414.
73. 73. Report on the Operation of the Treaty on European Union, European Commission, 10 May 1995, at para 137.
74. 74. Decision 96/668/CFSP, 22 Nov. 1996.
75. 75. Burghardt and Tebbe, “Die Gemeinsame Außenund Sicherheitspolitik der Europa¨ischen Union – Rechtliche Struktur und politischer Prozeß”, (1995) EuR, 1–20, 15. Krenzler and Schneider, op. cit. supra note 58 (1994) also pointed to the danger of Community procedures being affected by CFSP practice. Cf. also Keukeleire, op. cit. supra note 44, at 332–337.
76. 76. Keukeleire, op. cit. supra note 44, at 333.
77. 77. See Timmermans, “The uneasy relationship between the Communities and the Second Union Pillar: Back to the ‘Plan Fouchet’?”, (1996/1) LIEI, 61–70, at 69.
78. 78. PESC is the French abbreviation for CFSP.
79. 79. Keukeleire, op. cit.supra note 44, at 319.
80. 80. Cf. in this respect also Macleod, Hendry, Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities: A Manual of Law and Practice (Oxford, 1996), at 416: “… a Title V instrument may not itself take legislative or executive action which could only lawfully be taken under the Community Treaties; nor can it legally bind the Communities or their institutions acting in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the Community Treaties”.
81. 81. Council Decision 94/697/CFSP.
82. 82. Common Position 94/779/CFSP.
83. 83. See also Timmermans, op. cit. supra note 77, at 62; Ryba, “La politique e´trange‘re et de se´curite´ commune (PESC): Mode d’emploi et bilan d’une anne´e d’application (fin 1993/1994)”, (1995) RMC, No. 384, 14–35, at 21 and 25; and Willaert and Marque´s-Ruiz, op. cit. supra note 52, at 42. Other examples include the Joint Action regarding support for the transition towards a democratic and multi-racial South Africa (Council Decision 93/678/CFSP, Art. 3) and the Joint Action on the Stability Pact (Council Decision 94/367/CFSP, Art. 3).
84. 84. Timmermans, op. cit. supra note 77, at 63.
85. 85. Common Position 95/413/CFSP. A reference to a task of the Commission may also be found in Art. 6 of the Common Position on Burma/Myanmar (96/635/CFSP), which stipulates that the Presidency and the Commission will report to the Council. Equally striking is “… the Commission shall implement the joint action within the limits of the amount charged to the European Communities” (Decision 93/729/CFSP). The Joint Action on the Great Lakes Region (96/669/CFSP) provides: “The Community and its Member States will contribute to implementing those [UN] Resolutions in ways which they deem appropriate, and which they will coordinate in the manner set out in this Joint Action”. A clear instruction to the European Community was laid down in Art. 1 of Council Decision 94/366/CFSP of 13 June 1994: “The European Community shall prohibit satisfaction of the claims referred to in paragraph 9 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 757 (1992)”.
86. 86. Decision 94/942/CFSP and subsequent amendments. There are also other instances of references to CFSP actions in EC decisions; see e.g. the Council Decision of 19 Dec. 1994 concerning the conclusion of a Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of South Africa (94/822/EC, O.J. 1994, L 341), which refers to Decision 93/678/CFSP concerning support for the transition towards a democratic and multi-racial South Africa and the creation of an appropriate cooperation framework to consolidate the economic and social foundations of this transition.
87. 87. Timmermans, op. cit. supra note 77, at 69, rejects this option, which in his opinion would lead to a procedural imbroglio. He points at a possible illegality of combining, for instance, the cooperation procedure of Art. 130W EC (now Art. 179) with the unanimity requirement of Art. J.2 TEU (now Art. 15).
88. 88. Cf. also the judgment of the ECJ in the Titanium Dioxide case; Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council, [1991] ECR I-2895; see also Van Ooik, op. cit.supra note 28, at 374–375.
89. 89. More extensively: Van Ooik, op. cit. supra note 28, at 373–377, who also points to the fact that the necessity of a dual EC/CFSP legal basis will be rare.
90. 90. Commission Green Paper on Relations between the EU and the ACP countries on the Eve of the 21st Century – Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, COM(96)570, 20 Nov. 1996, Ch. IV, B.3.
91. 91. Cf. Peers, op. cit. supra note 63, at 372.
92. 92. Emiliou, op. cit.supra note 72, at 60.
93. 93. See more extensively on this issue: Macleod et al., op. cit. supra note 80, at 352–353.
94. 94. Although it is not expressly provided, it seems reasonable that the same Article can be used to suspend, relax, or lift sanctions. See also Macleod et al., op. cit. supra note 80, at 356. In fact, practice has confirmed this. The assertion that sanctions fall within the Community’s Common Commercial Policy was confirmed by the ECJ in its Commission v. Greece interim measures judgment, at least as far as sanctions involving trade in goods (Case C-120/94 R). Cf. Peers, op. cit. supra note 63, at 372. An important task in the preparation of Community initiatives on the basis of CFSP decisions is laid down for the Group of CFSP Counsellors. See Doc. 6384/95, Lignes directrices de proce´dure pour l’examen par le groupe des Conseillers PESC des positions communes ou actions communes comme pre´alable a’ des actes communautaires fonde´s sur l’article 228A ou sur les articles 228A et 73G et des actes communautaires correspondants, approved by the Council on 10 April 1995.
95. 95. Macleod et al., op. cit. supra note 80, at 356.
96. 96. However, examples can be found in the period of EPC. The case of the former Yugoslavia is illustrative in that this country was a party to agreements with the Community and was a beneficiary under preferential trading rules (see Decision 91/586/ECSC, EC, O.J. 1991, L 315/47). In the case of Haiti (a party to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention) existing international obligations were affected by Community sanctions imposed by the Community in 1993 (Council Regulation 1608/93/EEC, O.J. 1993, L 155/2 and an ECSC Decision of 30 May 1994, O.J. 1994, L 139/8). See Macleod et al., op. cit. supra note 80, at 361 and 365.
97. 97. See also Macleod et al., op. cit. supra note 80, at 356.
98. 98. This system should not be confused with “implementation” in the sense in which it is used in the Community context (with the Commission being vested with implementing powers under certain conditions (“comitology”)). It is not a question of delegation of powers; from a legal point of view the autonomy of the EC process is fully maintained. See for a recent example Common Position 1999/273/CFSP of 23 April 1999 which was used to decide on the imposition of an oil embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the subsequently adopted EC Regulation No. 900/1999 of 29 April 1999 which set out the economic measures to implement the CFSP decision.
99. 99. Along the same lines: Neuwahl, op. cit. supra note 45, at 239.
100. 100. Cf. also Macleod et al., op. cit. supra note 80, at 355: to be able to use Art. 301 EC “there is a need for a prior decision in accordance with the pillar of the Treaty dealing with common foreign and security policy”.
101. 101. Council Decision 94/366/CFSP of 13 June 1994 stipulates in its Art. 1: “The European Community shall prohibit satisfaction of the claims referred to in paragraph 9 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 757 (1992)”. On 11 July 1994 the EC Council obeyed this “order” and adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1733/94 (O.J. 1994, L 182) on the basis of Art. 228A EC (now Art. 310). Likewise, the Common Position on the oil embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999/273/CFSP) mentions in its preamble that action by the Community is needed in order to implement the measures.
102. 102. See e.g. Decisions 93/614/CFSP (Libya); 94/315/CFSP (Haiti); 94/672/CFSP (Bosnia-Herzegovina); or 94/673/CFSP (Yugoslavia).
103. 103. From a legal point of view it is not clear why a provision comparable to Art. 301 EC has not been inserted in the ECSC Treaty. The necessary ECSC Decisions following a CFSP Decision are now taken as a “Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting within the Council”.
104. 104. To date, only one exception to this rule can be discovered. Council Regulation (EC) No. 900/1999 of 29 April 1999 prohibiting the sale and supply of petroleum and certain petroleum products to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is not a follow-up to a Security Council Resolution. Instead it only refers to Common Position 1999/273/CFSP of 23 April 1999. The legality of economic sanctions that are not based on a Security Council Resolution will no doubt be subject to profound academic debate.
105. 105. Recommendation 94/313/EC of the Council of 30 May 1994, O.J. 1994, L 137.
106. 106. Art. 59 provides that in “exceptional circumstances”, in case of “serious difficulties” the Council, “on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB”, may take safeguard measures with regard to third countries for a period not exceeding six months if such measures are “strictly necessary”. See also Devroe and Wouters, op. cit. supra note 3, at 627.
107. 107. See Obradovic, “Repartiation of powers in the European Community”, 34 CML Rev. (1997), 59–88, 70.
108. 108. With the clear exception of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 900/1999 establishing the oil embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia referred to above. But one could also point to Common Position 98/374/CFSP of 8 June 1998 concerning the prohibition of new investment in Serbia and to Common Position 98/426/CFSP of 26 June 1998 on a ban on flights by Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community (sic!). See on the effects of UN sanctions in other legal systems, e.g. Coomans, Gru¨nfeld, Hartogh, Jansen, “Doorwerking en effecten van sanctiemaatregelen van de Verenigde Naties”, (1995) SEW, 501–513; and on the relation between UN and EC sanctions: Van den Oosterkamp and Wijmenga, “Sancties in relatie tot VN-resoluties en EU-besluitvorming”, (1996) VN-Forum, 6–10.
109. 109. Cf. Constantinesco et al., op. cit. supra note 50, at 761.
110. 110. Also Stein, “Das Zusammenspiel von Mitgliedstaaten, Rat und Kommission bei der gemeinsamen Außenund Sicherheitdspolitik der Europa¨ischen Union”, (1995) EuR, 69–81, 67; and Macleod et al., op. cit. supra note 80, at 354.
111. 111. Art. 133 EC may however continue to serve as a legal basis for economic measures which do not have foreign policy objectives, but which are e.g. directed at the protection of the internal market. See Stein, “Die gemeinsame Außenund Sicherheidtspolitiek der Union unter Beru¨cksichtigung der Sanktionsproblematik”, Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituts fu¨r Europarecht der Karl-Franzens Universita¨t, (Graz, 1993) and Stein, op. cit. supra note 110, at 80.
112. 112. Cf. also Lenaerts and De Smijter, “The United Nations and the European Union: Living apart together, in Wellens (Ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 439–458, at 449.
113. 113. Lenaerts and De Smijter, ibid., at 448.
114. 114. See e.g. the Common Position 94/165/CFSP concerning the imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment on Sudan; Common Position 96/184/CFSP concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia; Common Position 96/746/CFSP concerning the imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment on Afghanistan; Common Position 98/409/CFSP concerning Sierra Leone and Common Position 1999/206/CFSP on the imposition of an embargo on the export of arms, munitions and military equipment on Ethiopia and Eritrea.
115. 115. Art. 30 EC reads: “The provisions of Article 28 and 29 [on quantitative imports and exports; RAW] shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property ….” Restrictions to intra-Community movement of dual-use goods fall under this provision as well, as established by the ECJ in Case C-367/89, Aime´ Richardt. As we have seen exports of these goods to third States are now covered by Regulation 3381/94.
116. 116. Case C-367/89, Aime´ Richardt; Gilsdorf, op. cit. supra note 62, at 22. See also the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs of 6 April 1995 in Case C-120/94R, Commission v. Greece, in which he fleshed out the differences between Art. 30 (ex 36) and Art. 297 (ex 224): Art. 30 permits derogations from the free movement of goods only; Art. 297 permits derogations from the rules of the common market in general; furthermore situations covered by Art. 30 are exceptional, but those covered by Art. 297 are wholly exceptional.
117. 117. See Art. Y31 in the Commission’s proposals (Supplement 2/91, Bull. EC, at 103) and the 1993 proposals of the European Parliament, in particular Resolution A3-0109/94, 24 March 1994, O.J. 1994, C 114, p. 56 and Resolutions B4-0050, 0066, 0071, 0091, 0111 and 0115/95, 19 Jan. 1995, O.J. 1995, C 43, p. 89.
118. 118. See Gilsdorf, op. cit. supra note 62, at 20; Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities (Kluwer, 1998), at p. 682. The list is adopted by the Council (Doc. 255d/58 rev.), but was never officially published. A copy may be found in Towards a Stronger Europe (Independent European Programme Group (within NATO), Brussels, 1987). See also Colijn and Rusman, Het Nederlandse wapenexportbeleid 1963–1988 (The Hague, 1989).
119. 119. Case 222/84, Johnston, [1986] ECR 1651.
120. 120. Emiliou, op. cit. supra note 72, at 59.
121. 121. Cf. Macleod et al., op. cit. supra note 80, at 355 fn. 9: “Although Art. 224 [now 297; RAW] has been used in the past for collective action by the Member States … the use of the Article for collective action by the Member States is now less likely in view of the development of CFSP”.
122. 122. This procedure has only been used once. In 1994 Greece adopted unilateral measures imposing a trade embargo on (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia, referring to a “serious international tension constituting a threat of war”. The Commission brought this case before the Court, but it was struck off the Court register after the termination of the embargo; Case C-120/94R, Commission v. Greece.
123. 123. A.G.’s Opinion of 6 April 1995 in Case C-120/94. Compare also Case 222/84, Johnston.
124. 124. Lenaerts and De Smijter, op. cit. supra note 112, at 450. In addition Lenaerts and De Smijter pointed to Art. 307, providing that the EC Treaty shall not affect “[t]he rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the coming into force of [the EC] Treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other”. As confirmed in the Centro-Com Case (C-124/95, para 59), the Resolutions based on the UN Charter also fall within the field of application of Art. 297 EC (ex 234).
125. 125. See also Macleod et al., op. cit supra note 80, at 355.
126. 126. Cf. Constantinesco et al., op. cit. supra note 50, at 196.
127. 127. See e.g.: Dekker and Wessel, op. cit.supra note 5; Curtin and Dekker, op. cit. supra note 1; Tru¨e, op. cit. supra note 1; and De Witte, op. cit. supra note 1. In contrast to their earlier focus on the “intergovernmental” aspects of the non-Community areas of the Union (1995), Koenig and Pechstein now also seem to have accepted the existence of a Union legal system (“Unionsrechtsordnung”); see Koenig and Pechstein, “Die EU-Vertragsa¨nderung”, (1998) EuR, 130–150.
128. 128. “Die grundsa¨tzliche Gleichrangigkeit folgt aus dem Koha¨renzgebot: Das Koha¨renzgebot verlangt … nicht eine Anpassung des Rechts der einen Sa¨ule an das Recht einer anderen, sondern eine gegenseitige Abstimmung der Sa¨ulen”: Tru¨e, op. cit. supra note 1, at 61.
129. 129. See on the hierarchy of norms in relation to constitutional questions also Gaudin, “Amsterdam: l’eche‘c de la hie´rarchie des normes?”, (1999) RTDE, 1–20. Gaudin in particular pointed to the question as to what extent the Union constitution is bound to the “supra-constitutional” principles referred to in Art. 6 TEU.
130. 130. Cf. Curtin and Van Ooik, op. cit. supra note 6.
131. 131. De Bu´rca, “The institutional development of the EU: A constitutional analysis”, in Craig and De Bu´rca (Eds.), op. cit.supra note 1, 55–82, at 67–68. De Bu´rca in this respect pointed to the danger of “constitutional blurring” and the “negative consequences for the constitutional structure and the institutional balance established under the Community pillar”.
132. 132. Problems were already foreseen during the Maastricht negotiations. The Conference annexed a “Declaration on practical arrangements in the field of the common foreign and security policy” to the Treaty, which identified three areas in which ad hoc organizational arrangements were to enhance consistency: cooperation between COPO and COREPER, a merger of the EPC secretariat and the General-Secretariat of the Council, and cooperation between the Council and the Commission.
133. 133. See Keukeleire, op. cit. supra note 44, at 223.
134. 134. Timmermans, op. cit. supra note 77, at 62.
135. 135. See more extensively: Keukeleire, op. cit.supra note 44, at 337–339.
136. 136. Cf. Van Ooik, op. cit. supra note 28, at 356.
137. 137. See Weiler, “Neither unity nor three pillars – The trinity structure of the Treaty on European Union”, in Monar, Ungerer, Wessels (Eds.), op cit supra note 58); De Witte, op. cit. supra note 1 and Curtin and Dekker, op. cit.supra note 1 respectively.
138. 138. Regarding the “Russian doll”, it remains difficult to imagine different dolls being put together side by side in one larger doll.
139. 139. Tru¨e, op. cit. supra note 1; Curtin and Dekker, op. cit. supra note 1.
140. 140. Cf. in that respect Dashwood, “The Council of the European Union in the era of the Amsterdam Treaty”, in Heukels et al., op. cit. supra note 1, at 126, who also referred to the Union’s “sub-orders” rather than to “pillars”.