Learning from the past: Trends in executive compensation over the 20th century

CESifo Economic Studies

Volumn 55, Issue 3-4, 2009, Pages 458-481

  Frydman, Carola ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Managerial incentives; Market for managers

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION SYSTEM; COMPETITIVENESS; CONFERENCE PROCEEDING; CORPORATE STRATEGY; INCENTIVE; INCOME; LABOR MARKET; TWENTIETH CENTURY;

EID: 70849123475     PISSN: 1610241X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifp021     Document Type: Conference Paper

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