Recruiting and diversifying IMF technocrats

Global Society

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 167-187

  Momani, Bessma ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

IMF; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION;

EID: 17544383719     PISSN: 13600826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13600820500044878     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. For example, see Valerie Assetto, The Soviet Bloc in the IMF and the IRBD (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 8-9;
2. Kendall Stiles, Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lending Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 4-6;
3. Goh Chien Yen, "Accountability and Policy Dialogue: Bringing More Voices into the Policy Debate", in Barry Carin and Angela Wood (eds), Enhancing Accountability in the International Monetary Fund (Victoria: Centre for Global Studies, 2003), pp. 58-59;
4. Lisa Martin, "Distribution, Information, and Delegation to International Organizations: The Case of IMF Conditionality", unpublished paper. Program on International Organization and Change, p.4.;
5. ,
6. Miles Kahler, "External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Adjustment", in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds) The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 127;
7. Allan Drazen, "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach", IMF Staff Papers 49 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2002), p. 37.
8. Benno Galjart and Patricio Silva, Designers of Development: Intellectuals and Technocrats in the Third World (Leiden: Centre for the Study of Non Western Societies, 1995), pp. 1-15.
9. Of course the Fund architects' vision of an apolitical IMF decision-making process has not necessarily materialised. There are numerous cases of Fund politicisation by the Executive Board. For example, see Bessma Momani, "American Politicization of the International Monetary Fund", Review of International Political Economy, Vol.11, No. 5 (2004), pp. 880-904.
10. Susan Strange, "The Monetary Managers", in Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson (eds), The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-Making in International Organizations (London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 267.
11. Joseph Gold, Political Considerations are Prohibited by Articles of Agreement When the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, IMF Survey (Washington, DC: IMF, 1983), p. 148.
12. See David Pion-Berlin, "Political Repression and Economic Doctrines: The Case of Argentina", Comparative Political Studies, Vol.16, No.1 (1983), pp. 37-66;
13. Wilfred David, The IMF Policy Paradigm: The Macroeconomics of Stabilization, Structural Adjustment, and Economic Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985);
14. Lance Taylor, "IMF Conditionality: Incomplete Theory, Policy Malpractice", in Robert J. Myers (ed.), The Political Morality of the International Monetary Fund (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1986), pp. 93-109.
15. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.161-162.
16. See Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "Beyond Delegation", presentation to the Utah Meeting on Delegation to International Organizations, Brigham Young University, May 2-3, 2002, .
17. Goh Chien Yen, "Accountability and Policy Dialogue: Bringing More Voices into the Policy Debate", in Carin and Wood, op cit., pp. 58-59
18. Global Exchange, "World Bank and IMF", .
19. Kahler, op. cit., p. 127. Distributive Conflicts, and the States
20. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations", International Organization, Vol.53, No.4 (1999), p. 704.
21. I b i d.
22. See Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program", International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), pp. 367-390.
23. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
24. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions", ARENA Working Papers WP 99/24.
25. See John Williamson, Latin America Adjustment: How Much Has Happened (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), pp. 7-17.
26. Many have criticised the phrase 'Washington Consensus' for inaccurately describing a diversity of thought within the participating institutions. See Moises Naim, "Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?" Foreign Policy Magazine (October 1999), .
27. IMF, Economist Program, .
28. IMF, Recent Recruitment and Retention Experience, EBAP/84/121 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1984), p. 7. I would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of the IMF Archives for access to Fund documents.
29. Online. "Job Market Information 2003: PhD Program in Economics, West Virginia University", (April 2003).
30. IMF, Staff Recruitment and Retention, EBAP/97/30 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1997), p. 5.
31. IMF, Recent Recruitment and Retention Experience, EBAP/84/121 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1984), p. 6.
32. Ibid., p. 9.
33. IMF, Recruitment Policies and Practices, EBAP/91/176 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1991), p. 6.
34. Ibid., p. 6.
35. IMF, Staff Recruitment and Retention Experience, 1991-95, EBAP/96/ 26 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1996), p. 9.
36. Ibid., p. 3.
37. IMF, Staff Recruitment and Retention Experience in CY 1994, EBAP/ 95/23 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1995), p. 6.
38. IMF, Staff Recent and Retention, EBAP/97/30 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1997), p. 4.
39. IMF, External Evaluation of IMF Surveillance: Report by a Group of Independent Experts (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1999), p. 32.
40. IMF, Recent Recruitment and Retention Experience, EBAP/84/121 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1984), p. 9.
41. Ibid., p. 9.
42. I b i d.
43. IMF, The Fund's Personnel Policies and Objectives, EBAP/91/46 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1991), p. 3.
44. IMF, Recruitment Policies and Practices, EBAP/91/176 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1991), p. 2.
45. IMF, Staff Recruitment and Retention Experience 1997, EBAP/98/32 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1998), p. 7.
46. IMF, Articles of Agreement (Washington, DC: IMF, 1992), p. 32.
47. IMF, Recruitment Policies and Practices, EBAP/91/176 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1991), p. 11.
48. Ibid., p. 10.
49. Ibid., p. 10.
50. Ibid., p. 10.
51. IMF, Staff Recruitment and Retention, EBAP/97/30 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1997), p. 9.
52. Based on a 2004 interview with a former IMF executive director.
53. For more information about the Institute for the Economies in Transition and their type of work and policies, see .
54. IMF, Staff Recruitment and Retention, EBAP/97/30 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1997), p. 17.
55. In an interview a former senior staff member stated that the Fund was very diverse and culturally mixed. He believed that the Fund's statistics on staff nationalities underestimated actual diversity because many staff with American, Canadian and European passports were of other ethnic backgrounds or were naturalised citizens. Moreover, staff denoted as coming from developing countries were internationalised as members of elite and diplomatic families. Consequently, staff from developing countries were often culturally diverse and very internationalised. These observations of the former staff member are also in keeping with the point that most developing country staff members attended universities abroad which can be afforded by wealthy families.
56. IMF, Recent Recruitment and Retention Experience, EBAP/84/121 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1984), pp. 9, 23.
57. IMF, External Evaluation of IMF Surveillance: Report by a Group of Independent Experts (Washington, DC: IMF, 1999), p. 36.
58. Several staff members expressed this view in interviews conducted in 1999.
59. See IMF, Staff Recruitment and Retention, EBAP/97/30 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1997), p. 12.
60. Ibid., p. 12.
61. IMF, The Fund's Personnel Policies and Objectives, EBAP/91/46 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1991), p. 16.
62. See Ariel Buira, "IMF Financial Programs and Conditionality", Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 12 (1983), pp.111-36.
63. E-mail exchange with a former senior Fund staff member, February 13, 2004.
64. Quoted in Ian Clark, Should the IMF Become More Adaptive? IMF Working Papers (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1996), p. 25.
65. Ibid., p. 25.
66. Information based on interviews conducted with an individual formerly employed by an IMF executive director's office.