Career concerns incentives: An experimental test

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 571-588

  Koch, Alexander K ^a   Morgenstern, Albrecht ^b   Raab, Philippe ^c  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

^b Bundeskanzleramt (German Federal Chancellery) and IZA   (Germany)

^c Allianz AG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Career concerns; Experiments; Incentives; Reputation; Signal Jamming

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349463101     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014     Document Type: Article

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