Do elections always motivate incumbents? Learning vs. re-election concerns

Public Choice

Volumn 129, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 41-60

  Le Borgne, Eric ^a   Lockwood, Ben ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749369491     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-0863-6     Document Type: Review

References (19)

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13. Originally (1982) in Essays in economics and management in honor of lars wahlbeck (Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics).
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