Performance improvement and performance dysfunction: An empirical examination of distortionary impacts of the emergency room wait-time target in the English National Health Service

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 917-946

  Kelman, Steven ^a   Friedman, John N ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349448500     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: 14779803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mun028     Document Type: Article

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