What is the role of legal systems in financial intermediation? Theory and evidence

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 559-598

  Bottazzi, Laura ^a   Da Rin, Marco ^b   Hellmann, Thomas ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349092338     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: 10960473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2008.04.003     Document Type: Article

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